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THE LAWS OF ASIAN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS  
Gilles Cuniberti†
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to assess the preferences of 
parties to Asian international business transactions when they choose the law governing 
their contracts.  To that end, I conducted an empirical analysis of unpublished data of the 
four main arbitral institutions active in Asia (outside Mainland China) for the years 2011 
and 2012.  I found that three laws dominate the Asian market for international contracts:  
English law, U.S. law, and, to a lesser extent, Singapore law. This article makes three 
contributions.  First, it documents the regional variations in parties’ preferences:  the laws 
which are successful in Asia are different from those in Europe.  Second, it shows that, 
while English and U.S. laws might govern an equivalent number of transactions, they are 
chosen in very different circumstances.  U.S. laws are typically chosen in transactions 
between a U.S. and an Asian party where the parties also agree to settle their dispute in 
the United States under the aegis of the international division of the American Arbitration 
Association.  These are thus transactions where the bargaining power of the U.S. party 
was strong and enabled that party to impose choice of a U.S. dispute resolution institution 
and of a U.S. law.  By contrast, English law is chosen in transactions between parties of 
all nationalities, in the context of arbitration under the aegis of almost all institutions, in 
proceedings with their seat anywhere in Asia.  English law appears to be the only law to 
be considered as attractive to international commercial parties operating in Asia and 
seeking an option other than the laws of the party’s home country.  Finally, this article 
seeks to explain the remarkable attractiveness of English law in Asia.  It explores whether 
certain substantive rules of English law might be especially appealing to international 
commercial parties, and whether the fact that many Asian jurisdictions are former 
English colonies might play a role.  It concludes that the most convincing reasons are the 
wide presence of Commonwealth educated lawyers in Asia and concern about the 
American way of law.   
I. INTRODUCTION
Parties to international business transactions are free to choose the law 
governing their contracts, particularly in the context of international 
commercial arbitration.  Which law do they choose?  On which grounds?  
What does it reveal about their preferences?  
                                                   
† Professor of Private International Law, University of Luxembourg;  Visiting Professor, National 
University of Singapore.  J.D., Ph.D. in Law, Panthéon-Sorbonne University;  LL.M., Yale University.  I 
am grateful to Koji Takahashi, Stefan Vogenauer, Kun Fan, Patrick Kinsch and the participants to the 
faculty workshops at the Asser Institute and the University of Luxembourg for commenting on earlier 
drafts of this article.  I am also most grateful to Rachel Foxton at SIAC, to Primrose Law and Karen Tan at 
HKIAC, to Sylvie Picard Renaut at ICC and to Michael D. Lee at ICDR for providing me with data on the 
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Conventional wisdom posits that, despite the diversity of international 
commercial parties and international business transactions, the world of 
international business transactions is dominated by two laws:  English and 
New York law.  The general and the trade press regularly publish stories on 
the exorbitant privilege that these two laws enjoy1 and the competition that 
they have engaged with each other:  a clash of the titans between the only 
two great powers in the legal global market.2
Yet, there are few empirical studies on the laws governing 
international business transactions.  One reason is that the data is hard to 
gather.  Each year, private parties likely enter into millions of international 
commercial contracts and typically have no obligation to make such 
contracts available to the public.  In fact, many of these contracts are 
confidential. 
Scholars have nevertheless found three ways to collect data on 
international contractual practices.  The first is to take advantage of the rare 
legal obligations of certain groups of actors to publish such data.  For 
instance, such an obligation exists in the United States for publicly-held 
companies and Geoffrey Miller and Theodore Eisenberg published a number 
of articles in the late 2000s analyzing 2,800 contracts published in this 
context.3  Unfortunately, it appeared that these were, for the most part, 
domestic contracts between two U.S. parties.  As such, the data was more 
relevant to the analysis of U.S. contractual practices than international ones.  
The second way is to conduct interviews with practitioners.  In 2010, 
the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London 
conducted a survey of 150 practitioners and concluded that the two 
governing laws most frequently used by corporations were English law 
(40% of the cases) and New York law (17–22% of cases).4  No other state’s 
                                                   
1 Exorbitant Privilege, THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014. 
2 Tom Moore, Clash of the Titans, LEGAL BUSINESS (July 7, 2014, 9:00), http://www. 
legalbusiness.co.uk/ index.php/analysis/167-global-100-2014/2572-clash-of-the-titans. 
3 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York:  An Empirical Study 
of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1475 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York];  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, 
Market for Contracts];  Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal:  New Light on Contract Theory, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Bargains Bicoastal]. 
4 WHITE & CASE, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:  CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 14 (2010), http://events.whitecase.com/law/services/2010-International-Arbitration-Survey-
Choices.pdf  (17% of interviewees mentioned New York law, but 5% also mentioned “U.S. law” without 
further specification). 
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law was mentioned in more than 10% of cases.5  The geographic locations of 
interviewees were primarily Asia (35%), Western Europe (31%), and, to a 
lesser extent, North America (12%).6
Finally, scholars can analyze data gathered by international arbitration 
institutions.  In 2014, I published an analysis of the data gathered from 2007 
through 2012 by the world’s leading arbitration institution, the International 
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).7  The 
data concerned more than 4,400 international contracts involving close to 
12,000 parties from more than 120 countries.  My analysis revealed that 
contrary to conventional wisdom, the picture was much more complicated 
than a world dominated by English and U.S. laws, as Swiss law was chosen 
as often as U.S. laws.8  
These differences may well reveal the existence of significant regional 
variations in parties’ preferences.  For example, European parties are 
overrepresented in ICC arbitration.  They consistently account for more than 
half of the parties, with Asian (including Pacific) and American parties each 
accounting for another 20%.9  Is the success of Swiss law a regional 
phenomenon?  In 2008, two research institutes at Oxford University 
conducted a survey of 100 European businesses and concluded that the 
preferred laws of European parties were English (21%), German (16%), 
Swiss (14%), and French (14%) laws.10  U.S. laws were only mentioned by 
4% of interviewees as their preferred choice.11  
This article addresses regional variations by using the same 
methodology used in my previous work to focus on Asia.12  Unpublished 
                                                   
5 Id. at 14 (Swiss law:  8%, French law:  6%). 
6 Id. at 35. 
7 See generally Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts:  The Most Attractive 
Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 455 (2014). 
8 Id. at 458−59, 468, 472−73, 475.
9 Id. at 464. 
10 Stefan Vogenauer, Perceptions of Civil Justice Systems in Europe and their Implications for 
Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law:  an Empirical Analysis, in CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN 
EUROPE:  IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF FORUM AND CHOICE OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (Stefan Vogenauer & 
Christopher Hodges eds., forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Vogenauer, Perceptions of Civil Justice Systems].  
See also Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill, The European Community’s Competence to Pursue the 
Harmonisation of Contract Law—An Empirical Contribution to the Debate, in HARMONISATION OF 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW:  IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL 
PRACTICE 105 (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006). 
11 Vogenauer, Perceptions of Civil Justice Systems, supra note 10. 
12 For a recent study based on the survey of 127 practitioners focuses exclusively on China-related 
transactions see ASIAN LEGAL BUS., GOVERNING LAW SURVEY:  RESULTS AND TRENDS (Sophie Cameron, 
ed., 2014), http://www.legalbusinessonline.com/reports/practical-law-china’s-2014-governing-law-survey. 
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data of the main arbitral institutions active in Asia (outside Mainland China) 
from 2011 and 2012 was used to assess whether parties to Asian 
international business transactions have different preferences as far as choice 
of law is concerned.  The analysis found that three laws dominate the Asian 
market for international contracts:  English law, U.S. law, and, to a lesser 
extent, Singapore law.  In contrast to the governing law preferences of 
private European international contracts, parties to Asian arbitrations 
virtually never choose Swiss, German, or French laws.  
Second, this article reveals that the circumstances under which 
English and U.S. laws are chosen in Asia are very different.  U.S. laws—
generally New York or California laws—are typically chosen in transactions 
between a U.S. and an Asian party where the parties also agree to settle their 
dispute in the United States under the aegis of the international division of 
the American Arbitration Association:  the International Center for Dispute 
Resolution (ICDR).  Thus, these are transactions where, presumably, the 
U.S. party’s bargaining power was strong, enabling that party to impose its 
choice of a U.S. dispute resolution institution and of a U.S. law.  In other 
words, choice of U.S. laws seems to be a direct function of the economic 
power of U.S. corporations. 
By contrast, English law is chosen in transactions between parties of 
all nationalities, under the auspices of all institutions (except ICDR), in 
proceedings seated anywhere in Asia.  Where Asian international 
transactions are not governed by the law of one of the parties, which often 
means that neither party possessed sufficiently strong bargaining power to 
impose it, they are typically governed by English law.  English law 
dominates the Asian market for neutral laws, leaving only some room for 
Singapore law.  
While English and U.S. law might govern an equivalent number of 
Asian international contracts, English law appears to be the predominant 
choice when parties operating in Asia choose an option other than the law of 
one of their home countries.  Swiss law, English law’s biggest competitor in 
Europe, is nonexistent in Asia, nor are French and German laws, which are 
also regularly chosen as neutral laws in Europe.13  This begs the question of 
why parties find English law so attractive and, in particular, why parties find 
English law so much more attractive than Swiss and U.S. laws.  By seeking 
                                                   
13 See Cuniberti, supra note 7, at 472. 
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answers, this article also makes an important contribution to the scholarly 
debate on regulatory competition in the field of contract law.14  
This article is structured into four parts.  Part I provides background 
on the various arbitral institutions active in Asia and their respective 
caseloads.  Part II presents my empirical study of choice of law in Asian 
arbitration.  Part III assesses the international attractiveness of contract laws 
in Asia by determining which laws are chosen as neutral laws.  Part IV 
explains why English law is the most popular neutral law chosen in Asian 
business transactions. 
II. BACKGROUND: ARBITRATION IN ASIA
A. Arbitral Institutions  
1. The Big Four 
Four arbitral institutions dominate Asian international commercial 
arbitration outside Mainland China.  Each receives between 150 and 200 
cases per year.  Two are based in Asia and focus on Asia:  the Singapore 
International Arbitration Center (SIAC) and the Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).  The two others are global institutions:  the 
ICC and the ICDR.  Though they do not specifically focus on Asia, they 
receive a high number of cases involving Asian parties. 
Other important arbitral institutions are much less active in Asia.  For 
example, the London Court of International Arbitration handles far fewer 
cases involving Asian parties than the ICC or ICDR,15 while the Swiss 
Chambers’ Arbitration Institution16 and the Stockholm Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce handle even fewer.17
                                                   
14 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 3; Stefan Vogenauer, Regulatory 
Competition through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe:  Theory and Evidence, 21 
EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 13 (2013) [hereinafter Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition];  Giesela Rühl, Regulatory 
Competition in Contract Law:  Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 61 
(2013); REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 
2013). 
15 The London Court of International Arbitration, which handles less than 300 cases per year, reports 
that Asian parties accounted for only 14.75% in 2012 (India: 4.25%; Singapore:  1.75%; China: 2.25%;  
Other Asia Pacific:  6.5%) and 12.4% in 2013 (India:  2.7%;  Singapore:  2.7%;  Mongolia:  1.4%;   Other 
Asia Pacific:  5.6%) of the parties to LCIA arbitrations.  See SARAH LANCASTER, REGISTRAR’S REPORT 2 
(2013), http://www.lcia.org//LCIA/reports.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
16 Between 2004 and 2013, the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution handled 732 cases.  There 
were so few Asian parties that the institution’s statistics refer to a category including parties from both Asia 
and the Middle East, which accounted during this period for 9% of all parties to the 732 arbitrations.  See
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2. Mainland China 
A number of arbitral institutions based in Mainland China handle a 
high number of arbitration cases.  The biggest is the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).18  However, for 
purposes of this article, CIETAC data would not be as illuminating as the 
data from the four other institutions because generally any choice of law 
other than the law of the People’s Republic of China is rare in Mainland 
Chinese arbitrations,19 and in CIETAC arbitration in particular.  In any case, 
CIETAC has not answered requests to provide data on choice of law. 
3. Other Asian Institutions 
The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) reports a 
caseload of around 80 international arbitration cases per year.20  
Unfortunately, KCAB does not publish data on choice of law in the 
arbitration cases it handles.  Nor has it responded to requests asking whether 
such data are available. 
The Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) does not 
report regularly on its caseload.  In its Newsletter for January 2012,21 it 
published an article reporting its caseload from 2006 through 2010.  The 
number of international arbitration cases handled by JCAA averaged 
approximately 15 per year, reaching 21 cases in 2010.22  Another arbitral 
institution reported that JCAA handled nineteen international arbitrations in 
                                                                                                                                                       
SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARB. INST., ARBITRATION STATISTICS 2013 1 (2013), 
https://www.swissarbitration.org/sa/download/statistics_2013.pdf. 
17 Until 2010 and 2011, there were virtually no Asian parties involved in arbitration under 
the aegis of the Stockholm Institute.  In 2012 and 2013, a few Chinese (around ten) parties were 
involved. See ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS 2008-
2013 (2008-2013), http://www.sccinstitute.com/statistics/statistics-2008-2013. 
18 CIETAC has reported that it received 375 international cases in 2013.  See CIETAC Has Great 
Potential in Foreign-Related Commercial Arbitrations, CIETAC NEWSL. (China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arb. 
Comm’n, Beijing, P.R. China), Feb. 25, 2014. 
19 See JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 111í G HG  <LMLQ
Wang, Ascertaining Foreign Law in PRC Arbitration, 10 ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 93, 103 (2014) (stating that 
despite lack of data, “it is reasonable to estimate that a few” cases would be governed by foreign law). 
20 See KOREAN COMM. ARB. BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2013), http://www.kcab.or.kr/upload/ 
marketing/2013%20ࠉԷؿˈ۰(ࠒ߭).pdf  (KCAB reported 52 cases filed in 2010, 77 in 2011, 85 in 2012, 
and 77 in 2013). 
21 See Mark Goodrich, Japanese Arbitration—Much Work Done; Much Still to Do, JCAA NEWSL. 
(Japan Comm. Arb. Ass’n, Tokyo, Japan), Jan. 2012, http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration/docs/newsletter
27.pdf. 
22 Id. at 1 (11 cases in 2006, 12 in 2007, 12 in 2008, 17 in 2009 and 21 in 2010). 
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2012.23  Like the CIETAC and KCAB, the JCAA does not publish data on 
choice of law in the arbitration cases it handles.  However, data from the 
same study found that the vast majority of the law firms representing the 
parties in JCAA arbitrations were Japanese.24  Although these firms were 
also involved in a few domestic JCAA arbitrations,  this “suggests that 
Japanese law is frequently the governing law in such disputes, supporting 
the suggestion that it is those cases in which a Japanese party is in a strong 
bargaining position which tend to see JCAA arbitration clauses.”25
The Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) does 
not report regularly on its caseload.  In its Newsletter for October to 
December 2012, it reported a caseload of 85 cases for the year 2012, 20% of 
which were international.26  KLRCA does not publish data on choice of law 
in the arbitration cases it handles either.  It also has not responded to 
requests asking whether such data are available. 
Table 1:  Number of Asian International Commercial Arbitration Cases by Forum 
from 2011–2012 
Arbitral institution 2011 2012
SIAC (Singapore) 127 163
HKIAC (Hong Kong) 178 196
ICC (international) 163 169
ICDR (United States) 203 174
KCAB (South Korea) 77 85
JCAA (Japan) 20 19
KLRCA (Malaysia) 17 17
                                                   
23 Datuk Sundra Rajoo, Arbitration in Asia, NEWSL. OF KUALA LUMPUR REGIONAL CTR. FOR ARB.  
(Kuala Lumpur Regional Ctr. For Arbitration, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), July−Dec. 2012.  On KLRCA, 
see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
24 Goodrich, supra note 21, at 1 (14 out 19 firms in 2006, 19 out of 25 in 2007, 17 out of 23 in 2008, 
22 out of 30 in 2009 and 38 out of 48 in 2010). 
25 Id. at 2. 
26 See Rajoo, supra note 23. 
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This study will focus on the data provided by the four major arbitral 
institutions in Asia, which together handle more than 85% of international 
arbitration proceedings outside Mainland China. 
B. Nationalities of Parties to Asian Arbitrations 
1. The Singapore International Arbitration Center 
Between 2010 and 2013, the number of arbitrations filed with SIAC 
each year varied from 164 to 259.  The vast majority of them (70 – 86%) 
were international in character and thus governed by the Singapore 
International Arbitration Act.  The number of parties involved in those 
arbitrations varied from 328 to 504 parties per year. 
Table 2:  Number of Cases and Parties 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
International cases 166 127 163 223
Domestic cases 26 37 36 36
Cases (total) 192 164 199 259
Parties (total) 370 328 428 504
SIAC publishes detailed accounts of the nationalities of the parties 
involved in its arbitration proceedings in its annual reports since 2010.27  
                                                   
27 See SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., 2010 CEO’S ANNUAL REPORT (2010) [hereinafter SIAC, 2010
REPORT]; SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., 2011 CEO’S ANNUAL REPORT (2011) [hereinafter SIAC, 2011 REPORT]; 
SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., 2012 CEO’S ANNUAL REPORT (2012) [hereinafter SIAC, 2012 REPORT]; SING.
INT’L ARB. CTR., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 (2013) [hereinafter SIAC, 2013 REPORT]; SING. INT’L ARB. CTR.,
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Parties to SIAC proceedings annually originate from around forty 
countries,28 with a peak to fifty in 2013.  However, although parties come 
from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Asian parties 
clearly dominate.  Even if one excludes Singaporean parties, Asian parties 
account for more than 40% of all parties and for more than 50% of foreign 
parties.  European parties, which come next, typically account for less than 
10% of the parties, and North American parties account for 3 to 6%. 
Table 3:  Nationalities of Parties to SIAC Arbitrations 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Singapore 107 (29%) 79 (24%) 146 (34%) 132 (26%)
Other Asian 173 (46%) 132 (40%) 192 (45%) 216 (43%)
Europe 29 (7.8%) 69 (21%) 32 (7.4%) 56 (11%)
USA29 13 (3.5%) 13 (3.9%) 25 (5.8%) 23 (4.5%)
Caribbean Islands 24 (6.4%) 19 (5.7%) 13 (3%) 41 (8%)
Middle East 13 (3.5%) 6 (1.8%) 5 (1.1%) 10 (2%)
Australia30 6 (1.6%) 7 (2.1%) 9 (2.1%) 9 (1.8%)
Africa 5 (1.3%) 3 (0.9%) 6 (1.4%) 12 (2.4%)
Latin America 0 0 0 5 (1%)
Among Asian parties, besides Singaporeans, the most represented 
jurisdictions are India, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and the PRC.  SIAC appears 
to be the preferred Asian institution for parties from Indonesia and perhaps 
Malaysia. 
Table 4:  Nationality of Asian Parties to SIAC Arbitrations
2010 2011 2012 2013
India 36 (20.8%) 24 (18%) 42 (21.9%) 66 (30%)
Hong Kong 26 (15%) 23 (17.4%) 18 (9.3%) 17 (7.8%)
Indonesia 22 (12.7%) 20 (15%) 27 (14%) 34 (15.7%)
China (PRC) 14 (8%) 20 (15%) 44 (22.9%) 33 (15.3%)
Malaysia 12 (6.9%) 12 (9%) 14 (7.3%) 20 (9.2%)
Japan 11 (6.4%) 7 (5.3%) 4 (2.1%) 4 (1.8%)
South Korea 12 (6.9%) 7 (5.3%) 12 (6.3%) 19 (8.8%)
Vietnam 15 (8.7%) 3 (2.3%) 5 (2.6%) 4 (1.8%)
Thailand 7 (4%) 4 (3%) 6 (3.1%) 11 (5%)
Philippines 5 (2.8%) 3 (2.3%) 6 (3.1%) 4 (1.8%)
Taiwan 3 (1.7%) 2 (1.5%) 5 (2.6%) 3 (1.4%)
Sri Lanka 0 1 (0.75%) 3 (1.5%) 1 (0.4%)
                                                                                                                                                       
ANNUAL REPORT 2014 (2014) [hereinafter SIAC, 2014 REPORT]. All available at http://www.siac.org.sg/ 
2013-09-18-01-57-20/2013-09-22-00-27-02/annual-report. 
28 See id.  (Parties originated from 45 jurisdictions in 2010, 40 in 2011, and 39 in 2012). 
29 Also Canada in 2011 and 2013. 
30 Also Samoa in 2011 and New Zealand in 2013. 
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2. The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
In 2011 and 2012, there were respectively 275 and 295 arbitrations 
filed with HKIAC, respectively.  Around two-thirds of them were 
international in character.  
Table 5:  Number of Cases and Parties 
2010 2011 2012 
International cases 175 178 196
Domestic cases 116 97 99
Cases (total) 291 275 295
Parties (total) 582 313 472
The HKIAC’s data on the nationalities of the parties involved in its 
arbitration proceedings reveal several commonalities with the SIAC’s data.  
For example, parties to HKIAC arbitrations annually originate from around 
forty countries, but Asian parties also clearly dominate.  Even if one sets 
aside Hong Kong parties, Asian parties account for more than 40% of all 
parties, and for more than 50% of foreign parties.  European parties, which 
come next, typically account for less than 10% of the parties, and North 
American parties account for 2–5%. 
Table 6:  Nationalities of Parties to HKIAC Arbitrations
2011 2012 
Hong Kong 100 (31%) 179 (38%)
Other Asian 149 (47%) 205 (43%)
Europe 16 (5.1%) 38 (8%)
Caribbean Islands 25 (7.9%) 14 (2.9%)
USA31 15 (4.7%) 12 (2.5%)
Africa 4 (1.2%) 9 (1.9%)
Australia/Samoa 2 (0.6%) 5 (1%)
Latin America 1 (0.3%) 8 (1.7%)
Middle East 1 (0.3%) 0
Among Asian parties, besides Hong Kong parties, the most 
represented jurisdictions are the PRC, Singapore, South Korea, and India.  
The HKIAC appears to be the preferred Asian institution for Chinese parties 
choosing to resolve their disputes outside of the Mainland.  
                                                   
31 Also Canada in 2012. 
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Table 7:  Nationalities of Asian Parties to HKIAC Arbitrations
2011 2012 
China (PRC) 87 (58%) 114 (55%)
Singapore 14 (9.4%) 38 (18.5%)
South Korea 9 (6%) 14 (6.8%)
India 4 (2.6%) 15 (7.3%)
Japan 9 (6%) 1 (0.5%)
Indonesia 5 (3.3%) 2 (1%)
Malaysia 2 (1.3%) 1 (0.5%)
Vietnam 2 (1.3%) 4 (2%)
Thailand 0 2 (1%)
3. The ICC International Court of Arbitration  
Unlike the SIAC and HKIAC, the International Court of Arbitration of 
the ICC is a global institution not specifically focused on Asia.  However, it 
is an important player in Asian arbitration because it handles both 
arbitrations with an Asian seat and arbitrations involving Asian parties with 
a seat outside of Asia.   
In 2011 and 2012, Asian parties were involved in 163 and 169 ICC 
cases, respectively, but only 59 and 71 arbitrations had their seat in Asia.  
This suggests that the seat of arbitrations involving Asian parties is in Asia 
in around 40% of the cases.  Thus, most ICC arbitrations involving Asian 
parties are necessarily seated outside of Asia.  When ICC arbitrations are in 
Asia, they are typically in Singapore or Hong Kong, with 54–66% of those 
proceedings seated in these two jurisdictions. 
Table 8:  Number of Cases and Parties 
2011 2012
ICC Cases involving an Asian Party 163 169
Number of Asian Parties involved in an ICC Case 303 299
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Table 9:  Asian Seats in ICC Arbitrations
2010 2011 2012 
Singapore 24 24 36
Hong Kong 14 8 11 
India 7 6 11 
Japan 3 5 3 
Thailand 4 2 1 
Malaysia 2 4 1 
Sri Lanka 3 0 3
Philippines 0 4 1
Vietnam 0 3 0 
South Korea 0 1 2 
China (PRC) 0 1 1 
Taiwan 1 0 1
Indonesia 0 0 0 
Australia 2 1 0
Total 60 59 71 
The most represented Asian jurisdictions in ICC arbitrations are India, 
the PRC, and South Korea.  The ICC also appears to be the preferred 
institution for Indian and South Korean parties.  
Table 10:  Nationalities of Asian Parties to ICC Arbitrations
2010 2011 2012 
India 71 (27.8%) 53 (17.5%) 81 (27%)
China (PRC) 27 (10.6%) 37 (12.2%) 28 (9.4%)
South Korea 23 (9%) 26 (8.6%) 41 (13.7%)
Hong Kong 24 (9.4%) 11 (3.6%) 26 (8.7%)
Japan 21 (8.2%) 24 (7.9%) 17 (5.7%)
Singapore 21 (8.2%) 13 (4.3%) 24 (8%)
Indonesia 10 (3.9%) 19 (6.3%) 17 (5.7%)
Malaysia 8 (3.1%) 21 (6.9%) 11 (3.7%)
Vietnam 7 (2.8%) 12 (4%) 5 (1.7%)
Thailand 10 (3.9%) 8 (2.6%) 9 (3%)
Philippines 1 (0.4%) 41 (13.5%) 5 (1.7%)
Other32 32 (12.6%) 38 (12.5%) 35 (11.7%)
Total 255 303 299 
4. The International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
As with the ICC, the ICDR is a global institution that is not 
specifically focused on Asia.  However, like the ICC, it is an important 
                                                   
32 Including Australia, which accounted for 10 parties in 2010, 12 in 2011 and 10 in 2012. 
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player in Asian arbitration because it handles a significant number of 
arbitrations involving Asian parties.   
Table 11:  Number of Cases and Parties
2010 2011 2012 2013 
ICDR Cases involving an Asian Party 209 203 174 237
Number of Asian Parties involved in an ICDR 
Case 
226 233 208 265
The most represented Asian jurisdictions in ICDR arbitration are 
Japan, India, and the PRC.  The ICDR appears to be the preferred Asian 
institution for Japanese and Australian parties. 
Table 12: Nationalities of Asian Parties to ICDR Arbitrations
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Japan 51 (22.5%) 59 (25.3%) 45 (21.6%) 51 (19.2%)
India 36 (16%) 33 (14.1%) 40  (19.2%) 63 (23.7%)
China (PRC) 20 (8.8%) 31 (13.3%) 26 (12.5%) 36 (13.6%)
Hong Kong 9 ( 4%) 12 (5.1%) 11 (5.3%) 24 (9%)
South Korea 4 (1.7%) 18 (7.7%) 11 (5.3%) 16 (6%)
Taiwan 11 (4.8%) 13 (5.5%) 13 (6.2%) 6 (2.2%)
Singapore 4 (1.7%) 7 (3%) 6 (2.9%) 9 (3.3%)
Malaysia 2 (0.8%) 2 (0.8%) 2 (0.9%) 15 (5.6%)
Philippines 5 (2.2%) 5 (2.1%) 3 (1.4%) 4 (1.5%)
Thailand 3 (1.3%) 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.3%)
Indonesia 0 0 1 (0.5%) 2 (0.7%)
Other33 81 (36%) 62 (26%) 49 (23.6%) 38 (14.3%)
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON CHOICE OF LAW IN ASIA
The purpose of this article is to gather and analyze empirical evidence 
on commercial parties’ choice of contract law in international transactions.  
At the outset, the study of international contractual practices presents 
numerous methodological difficulties.  The first and most obvious one 
comes from a lack of access to relevant data, as public information is scarce.  
Many commercial contracts are subject to confidentiality clauses.  
Moreover, even in the absence of a confidentiality clause, private 
commercial parties are typically not obligated to make their contracts 
public.34  A second difficulty is the sheer volume of international 
                                                   
33 Including Australia and New Zealand, which accounted respectively for 75 and 0 parties in 2010, 
55 and 4 in 2011, 32 and 5 in 2012, and 25 and 6 in 2013. 
34 In some circumstances, applicable law may compel certain types of commercial actors to publish 
some of their contracts (in whole or in part), but these contracts could, at best, only aid in understanding the 
practices of those subject to such requirement.  Moreover, the contracts might not be international.  For 
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commercial contracts concluded around the world.  The total number is 
undoubtedly enormous, raising questions about the representativeness of any 
sample that is considered as part of an empirical study. 
Despite these methodological difficulties, the statistics gathered by 
arbitral institutions are meaningful for an empirical study of the contractual 
practices of international commercial parties.  At the same time, the 
representativeness of data of arbitral institutions can be challenged in two 
respects.  First, such data only concerns contracts that resulted in arbitration 
proceedings.  Unlike these contracts, most commercial contracts do not give 
rise to disputes.  As such, the data of arbitral institutions are not 
representative of international commercial contracts in general, but only of 
those which give rise to disputes that were not able to be resolved without 
resort to external dispute resolution mechanisms.  Such disputes may have 
arisen out of these particular contracts by virtue of the clauses they contain, 
which in turn may have incentivized the parties to seek external resolution.  
These clauses might also have included choice of law clauses.  Thus, one 
might argue that data of arbitral institutions do not reveal a commercial 
party’s choice of laws preferences so much as the choice of law preferences 
of parties who eventually sue each other. Taking that argument to its logical 
conclusion, this could mean that some laws may be more susceptible to 
external dispute resolution than others.   
While this hypothesis cannot be excluded, the data available for this 
study suggests it should be rejected.  Some laws might require and be more 
prone to external dispute resolution because they lack precision.  If so, a law 
that affords detailed and precise rules should be less prone to external 
dispute resolution and therefore should not be well represented in contracts 
that end up in arbitration.35  This is because rational contracting parties 
theoretically seek to maximize clarity in their agreements by choosing laws 
with bright-line rules.  English law is often described as encompassing one 
of the most precise and detailed bodies of contract laws in the world.  If the 
choice of the law governing contracts significantly impacts the rate of 
external dispute resolution, one would expect to see English law the least 
often in arbitration, given its precision and breadth.  To the contrary:  in this 
study, English law appears to be the most attractive and frequently selected 
                                                                                                                                                       
instance, U.S. law requires publicly traded companies to publish portions of certain types of contracts, a 
review of which revealed that they were typically domestic.  See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, 
supra note 3, at 1487. 
35 Precise rules should make the outcome of litigation predictable and, therefore, more likely to give 
the parties an incentive to negotiate a settlement without incurring litigation costs. 
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law for commercial actors resorting to external dispute resolution, indicating 
that there are other forces at work.36
  The second peculiarity with respect to data provided by arbitral 
institutions is that the relevant international contracts have given rise to 
disputes that the parties have chosen to arbitrate rather than litigate.  
Commercial contracts providing for arbitration are likely to differ from other 
contracts in one important respect:  the average value of these contracts is 
generally much higher.  This is because arbitration is significantly more 
expensive than litigation in most countries.  Arbitrators must be 
compensated and attorneys often charge higher fees.37  As a result, the 
assumption is that sophisticated parties provide for arbitration only when a 
certain minimum value is at stake.38  The link between this monetary issue 
and the parties’ choice of law, however, seems tenuous.  Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to presume that sophisticated commercial actors engaging in 
high-stake transactions are far less likely than parties in lower-stake 
transactions to leave the choice of law governing their contracts to the 
vagaries of private international law.  Rather, such parties are far more likely 
to invest their resources in negotiating an acceptable choice of applicable 
law provision.  Thus, data of arbitral institutions may actually be much more 
meaningful than a sample of international cases adjudicated in national 
courts. 
  Another reason why parties would choose arbitration over litigation 
may be that they have far greater freedom to choose their preferred contract 
law in the context of international arbitration than in litigation before 
national courts.    This is because the vast majority of national arbitration 
                                                   
36 Of course, it is possible that the study will still understate the attractiveness of English law, which 
might be underrepresented in arbitral data as contracts governed by English law may be less likely to give 
rise to disputes (or at least disputes that require external dispute resolution) than others. 
37 This statement might come as a surprise to many U.S. lawyers, as the United States is one of the 
few, if not the only jurisdiction where arbitration is perceived as a cheaper mode of dispute resolution.  
However, litigation is much cheaper in civil law jurisdictions, if only because of the absence of pre-trial 
discovery and of the much shorter duration of trials.  As a consequence, lawyers charge much less for 
litigation and arbitration appears as a much more sophisticated and expensive mode of dispute resolution. 
38 Around half of the cases going to ICC arbitration involve values between USD 1 million and 30 
million.  See Int’l Ct. of Arb., 2011 Statistical Report, 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 5, 14 (2011) [hereinafter 
Int’l Ct. of Arb., 2011 Report] (50.9% in 2011); Int’l Ct. of Arb., 2012 Statistical Report, 24 INT’L CT. OF 
ARB. BULL. 5, 13 (2012) [hereinafter Int’l Ct. of Arb., 2012 Report] (50.3% in 2012).  The average value of 
disputes in SIAC cases in 2011 and 2012 was respectively USD 5 and 6.5 million.   See SIAC, 2011
REPORT, supra note 27; SIAC, 2012 REPORT, supra note 27.  The average claim made in ICDR Asian cases 
in 2011 and 2012 was respectively USD 7 and 3.5 million (data provided by ICDR and on file with author).  
Finally, HKIAC does not report the average value of the cases it handles. 
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laws recognize parties’ unlimited freedom to choose the applicable 
governing law,39 whereas courts will sometimes only enforce the parties’ 
choice of law if the relevant clause in the contract calls for the application of 
a law connected to the dispute.40  The statutes governing international 
arbitration in the major Asian arbitration centers all give the parties full 
freedom to choose whichever law they wish to govern the substance of their 
dispute.  On this point, both Hong Kong and Singapore have enacted Article 
28 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which 
merely provides that the “arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable 
to the substance of the dispute.”41  
Moreover, national judges are almost invariably lawyers trained in a 
single legal system.  Sophisticated parties might thus be reluctant to ask a 
national court to apply any foreign laws since doing so could not only be 
costly but could easily result in errors and misinterpretations of that foreign 
law’s content.  In contrast, members of arbitral tribunals typically do not 
come from a single legal background.  The parties can freely choose the 
tribunal members after a particular dispute arises.  This allows them to take 
the specific dispute and the applicable law into account when choosing 
tribunal members and appointing arbitrators familiar with the applicable law.  
The freedom to choose arbitrators based on their background and expertise 
allows commercial actors, at the time of formation, to ignore questions about 
the quality and skill of the future adjudicator.  Below, I present and analyze 
the data on choice of law provided by the four major arbitral institutions in 
Asia. 
A. Presentation of the Data of the Four Arbitral Centers 
1. The Singapore International Arbitration Center 
SIAC provided data on choice of law in the cases that resulted in 
arbitration proceedings filed with SIAC from 2010 to 2012.  SIAC 
                                                   
39 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), MODEL 
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, at Art. 28(1), U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (1985). 
40 This has long been the general rule in the United States.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  The only exception is that a number of states have 
derogated to the Restatement for choices of forum law under certain conditions.  See, e.g., Choice of Law, 
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §5–1401 (1984); Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 3, at 2091. 
41   Singapore International Arbitration Act 1994 (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed); Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 609, 26 § 64 (H.K.). 
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published, for the first time, data on choice of law in its 2013 annual 
report.42  Unfortunately, the data published for 2013 is less detailed than that 
provided for previous years insofar as it does not indicate which laws were 
chosen in less than 7.4% of the cases and does not distinguish between 
domestic and international cases.43  The data from 2010 to 2012 appear in 
Table 13. 
Table 13:  Substantive Law Chosen in SIAC Arbitrations (Cases) 
International Cases 2010 2011 2012 
English law 33 (19.8%) 31 (24.4%) 31 (19%)
Singapore law 69 (41.56%) 69 (54.33%) 76 (46.62%)
Chinese law 0 2 (1.57%) 3 (1.84%)
Indian law 11 (6.26%) 2 (1.57%) 14 (8.58%)
Indonesian law 12 (7.22%) 6 (4.72%) 6 (3.68%)
New York law 1 (0.6%) 0 1 (0.61%)
Other 21 (12.6%) 7 (5.5%) 16 (9.81%)
UNIDROIT principles 0 0 1 (0.61%)
CISG 2 (1.2%) 1 (0.78%) 1 (0.61%)
Unspecified 17 (10.8%) 9 (7%) 14 (8.58%)
Domestic Cases 
Singapore law 25 (96.2%) 15 (40.5%) 17 (47%)
English law 0 16 (43.2%) 8 (22.2%)
Chinese law 0 1 (2.7%) 0
Indian law 0 0 4 (11.1%)
UNIDROIT principles 0 0 2 (5.55%)
Other 0 3 (8.1%) 3 (8.3%)
Unspecified 1 (3.8%) 2 (5.4%) 2 (5.55%)
Between 2010 and 2013, most parties choosing to arbitrate under the 
aegis of SIAC chose one of two laws to govern their contract, and thus the 
substance of the dispute.  Singapore law was preferred, chosen in 41–54% of 
international cases.  English law was also regularly chosen in around 20% of 
international cases.  Next came, depending on the year, either Indian or 
Indonesian law, but neither was chosen in more than 10% of cases in a given 
year.  U.S. state laws, in particular New York law, were virtually never 
chosen. 
The idea of choosing non-state laws in international arbitration has 
generated heated debates and an enormous volume of literature in the last 
                                                   
42 SIAC, 2013 REPORT, supra note 27, at 12. 
43 Id.  (The data for both domestic and international SIAC cases (259) are:  Singapore law:  44.5%; 
English law:  31.6%; Indian law:  7.4%; unspecified:  8.6%; other:  7.8%). 
52 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 1 
fifty years.44  Despite these debates, there is no doubt that Article 28 of the 
Model Law, insofar as it refers to “rules of law,” allows parties to provide 
for the application of rules other than national laws.45  An empirical study of 
the cases referred to the ICC has shown that commercial actors very rarely 
use this power, and virtually always provide for the application of national 
laws.46  The SIAC’s data is the first indication that parties to Asian 
arbitrations are equally reluctant to choose non-state laws.  
2. The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
HKIAC provided data on choice of law in the cases that resulted in 
arbitration proceedings filed with HKIAC from 2010 to 2012.  
Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between international and 
domestic arbitration.  
Table 14: Substantive Law Chosen in all HKIAC Cases
2010 2011 2012 
English law 53 (18%) 111 (40.36%) 122 (41.62%)
Hong Kong law 105 (37%) 66 (24%) 84 (28.65%)
Chinese law 5 (1%) 8 (2.91%) 27 (9.19%)
U.S. laws 0 9 (3.2%) 4 (1.1%)
Other 0 2 (0.7%) 9 (3%)
Unspecified 128 (44%) 79 (28.73%) 49 (16.76%)
Based on the foregoing data, I assume that parties to domestic 
arbitrations in Hong Kong would either provide for the application of the 
law of Hong Kong, or would not specify the applicable law.  I therefore 
allocated and subtracted domestic cases from these two categories of cases 
in accordance with their share of the total.  
                                                   
44 See, e.g., Lord Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, 4 ARB.
INT’L 86 (1988);  Berthold Goldman, Nouvelles Réflexions sur la Lex Mercatoria, FESTSCHRIFT PIERRE 
LALIVE 241 (1993);  Paul Lagarde, Approche Critique de la Lex Mercatoria, ETUDES OFFERTES À 
BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 125 (1987);  Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2007); Symeon Symeonides, Party Autonomy and Private-Law Making 
in Private International Law:  The Lex Mercatoria that Isn't, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF K. KERAMEUS 1379 
(2009); Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law:  A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making? 17 
ARB. INT’L. 59 (2001); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA
(2nd ed. 2010); STEVEN C. BENNET, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. 
ed. 1998). 
45 See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999);  JULIAN LEW, LOUKAS MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003). 
46 See, Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 369 
(2014).   See also, Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law:  An Empirical Look at the 
New Law Merchant, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523 (2005). 
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Table 15: Substantive Law Chosen in HKIAC International Cases
2010 2011 2012 
English law 53 (30.28%) 111 (62.35%) 122 (62.24%)
Hong Kong law47 105 - (0.45x116) = 53 
(30.28%) 
66 - (0.45x97) = 22 
(12.35%) 
84 - (0.63x99) = 22 
(11.22%) 
Chinese law 5 (2.8%) 8 (4.5%) 27 (13.77%)
U.S. laws 0 9 (5%) 4 (2%)
Other 0 2 (1.1%) 9 (4.6%)
Unspecified48 128 - (0.54x116) = 64 
(36.57%) 
79 - (0.54x97) = 26 
(14.6%) 
49 – (0.37x99) = 12 
(6.12%) 
Between 2010 and 2012, the vast majority of parties choosing to 
arbitrate under the aegis of HKIAC also typically chose one of two laws:  
English or Hong Kong law.  The preference for English law and the law of 
the seat of the arbitration was stronger in Hong Kong than in Singapore, as 
other laws were very rarely chosen (less than 5% in each).  The only 
exception was in 2012, where the law of the PRC was chosen in almost 14% 
of cases.  
As in SIAC arbitrations, the number of parties that chose U.S. state 
laws was remarkably low.  In 2010, no parties agreed on the application of a 
U.S. state law. In 2011, Delaware state law was chosen in seven contracts 
and New York state law and that of the “USA” were chosen in one contract 
each.  Finally, in 2012, California state law and New York state law were 
each chosen in two contracts. 
Finally, non-state laws were not chosen in any of the cases referred to 
HKIAC in the relevant period, which confirms the reluctance of parties to 
Asian arbitrations to choose non-state laws.  It is noteworthy that the 
HKIAC Model Clause does not specifically encourage parties to provide for 
the applicable law, while the SIAC Model Clause encourages parties to 
provide for the application of a national law.  One would thus expect to see 
                                                   
47 The first figure in each of the three columns is the total number of cases where Hong Kong (HK) 
law was chosen (e.g. 105 in 2011).  As explained above, I consider that parties in domestic cases would 
either choose HK law, or not specify the applicable law.  Thus, I assume that the number of domestic cases 
where HK law was chosen is the ratio of choices of HK law over the sum of choices of HK law plus 
unspecified cases (e.g., 45% in 2011) multiplied by the number of domestic cases in a given year (e.g., 116 
in 2011).  I then subtract domestic cases from the total number of cases to find the number of international 
cases where HK law was chosen. 
48 Same as in previous footnote, but for the purpose of calculating the number of international cases 
where no choice of law was specified.  The ratio applied is unspecified cases over the sum of choices of 
HK law and unspecified cases. 
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more cases of choice of non-state law in arbitrations administered by 
HKIAC rather than SIAC.49  
3. The ICC International Court of Arbitration  
The ICC provided detailed data on choice of law in arbitration 
proceedings involving Asian parties filed with the ICC in 2011 and 2012.  
The data are summarized in Table 16.  
Table 16: Substantive Law Chosen in ICC Asian Arbitrations
2011 2012
English law 19 (11.65%) 30 (17.7%)
U.S. laws 15 (9.2%) 11 (6.5%)
Indian law 9 (5.5%) 14 (8.2%)
Swiss law 8 (4.9%) 10 (5.9%)
Singapore law 5 (3%) 9 (5.3%)
Hong Kong law 2 (1. 2%) 8 (5.2%)
Chinese law (PRC) 5 (3%) 3 (1.7%)
Other 54 (33%) 51 (30%)
Unspecified 46 (28%) 33 (19.5%)
The ICC data differ from the data of SIAC and HKIAC.  The ICC 
data cover all cases involving an Asian party.  Contrary to SIAC and 
HKIAC, the seat of ICC arbitration is typically outside of Asia.50  It is likely 
that this difference explains some of the ICC data on choice of law.  In 
certain jurisdictions, the seat of the arbitration seems to have an important 
impact on the law chosen by the parties to govern their transaction.  
Switzerland is one such example.  The applicable law almost always follows 
the seat of the arbitral forum.51  
As far as Asia is concerned, SIAC data suggest that this is also the 
case for Singapore52 and HKIAC data suggest the same for Hong Kong, but 
to a lesser extent.53  The ICC’s data do not confirm the importance of the 
seat for Singapore.  In 2011 and 2012, Singapore was the seat of 24 and 36 
ICC arbitrations, respectively, but Singapore law was only chosen in five 
and nine cases respectively.  
                                                   
49 As of August 1, 2014, HKIAC Model Clause was amended and now does encourage parties to 
provide for the applicable law. 
50 See supra text immediately preceding Tables 8 & 9. 
51 See Cuniberti, supra note 7, at 475−76.
52 See supra Table 13. 
53 See supra Table 14. 
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By contrast, in 2011 and 2012, Hong Kong was chosen as a seat in 
respectively eight and eleven cases, and Hong Kong law was chosen in two 
and eight cases respectively.  Given the attractiveness of Hong Kong as a 
seat for parties originating from Mainland China,54 it is interesting to 
aggregate the data concerning Hong Kong and the PRC.  In 2011, the PRC 
was chosen as a seat in one ICC arbitration, and in 2012, the law of the PRC 
was chosen in five and three cases respectively.  In total, Hong Kong and the 
PRC were chosen as a seat in nine and twelve cases, and one of the two laws 
was chosen in seven and eleven cases. 
The ICC data also differ from SIAC and HKIAC data insofar as 
English law is less dominant in Asian ICC arbitration than it is in SIAC and 
HKIAC arbitrations.  U.S. laws are chosen more often in these proceedings 
as governing law.  It could not be verified whether this difference was 
correlated with a seat of the arbitration in the United States.55  
Finally, the ICC data is similar to SIAC and HKIAC data with respect 
to choice of non-state laws.  In 2011 and 2012, there was only one case in 
which the parties chose a set of rules other than a national law to govern 
their contract.  There, the parties had chosen the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as primary 
governing law and Swiss law as the subsidiary governing law.  The ICC data 
further demonstrate the reluctance of Asian parties to choose non-state law. 
4. The International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
Unfortunately, data on choice of law in ICDR cases are unavailable.  
The ICDR has yet to invest the human resources needed to gather this 
information.  However, ICDR officials have identified certain features that 
are shared by the vast majority of ICDR cases involving Asian parties.56  
First, the other party is usually an American party.57  Second, the seat of the 
arbitration is typically located in the United States.58
                                                   
54 See supra text immediately preceding Table 7. 
55  For the purpose of a study of choice of law in Latin American arbitration that the author is 
currently conducting, the ICC provided more detailed data which show that the choice of U.S. laws is 
typically correlated with a seat of the arbitration in the United States. 
56 Interview with Michael D. Lee, Vice President of ICDR/AAA for Asia, Singapore (Jan. 23, 2015). 
57 Id.  Mr. Lee insisted, however, on the fact that characterizations of the nationality of commercial 
parties to international transactions raised a number of problems as soon as subsidiaries of international 
groups were concerned. 
58 Id. 
56 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 1 
These views are shared by a number of experienced practitioners in 
Asia.  James E. Hough is head of the Litigation Department of the Tokyo 
office of the U.S. law firm Morrison & Foerster, and was previously head of 
the Litigation Department in the New York office of the same firm.  If one 
focuses on the number of non-Japanese partners, Morrison & Foerster is 
clearly the largest international firm in Japan with almost three times more 
U.S.-educated partners than any other firm in Japan.  Japan is an important 
jurisdiction for ICDR Asian arbitration, as it was the most represented Asian 
nationality in ICDR arbitration from 2010 until 2012 and a close second in 
2013.  In all Asian ICDR arbitrations in which Mr. Hough was involved, the 
seat of the arbitration was in the United States (New York or California) and 
one of the parties was from the United States.59    The only exception was an 
ICDR arbitration between a Japanese party and a Korean party, but the 
Korean party was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. company.60  When 
asked whether he would think that these features concern the vast majority 
of ICDR arbitrations involving Asian parties, Mr. Hough wrote that he 
believed so.61  Kap-You (Kevin) Kim is head of the International Arbitration 
and Litigation practice group of Bae Kim & Lee LLC, a leading Korean law 
firm.  Chambers Asia reports that Mr. Kim is “one of the most respected 
figures in the Asian arbitration space” and “the best Korean lawyer in the 
field of arbitration in Asia.”62  Mr. Kim’s experience also has been that the 
vast majority of Asian ICDR arbitrations are seated in the United States and 
involve one U.S. party.63  However, there are exceptions:  Mr. Kim was 
involved in a few ICDR arbitrations with a seat in Singapore or Japan, but 
those arbitrations always involved a U.S. party.64  Finally, Dr. Michael J. 
Moser has advised foreign clients in the Asia-Pacific region since 1980.  He 
has acted as arbitrator, mediator, or counsel in more than 300 international 
proceedings.65  Dr. Moser’s personal experience also has been that the vast 
                                                   
59 E-mail from James E. Hough, Partner, Morrison Foerster, to Gilles Cuniberti, Professor of Private 
Int’l Law, Univ. of Lux. (Feb. 24, 2015) (on file with author). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Professionals:  Kap-You (Kevin) Kim, BAE KIM & LEE, http://www.bkl.co.kr/front/law/prf/ 
memberView.do?lang=eng&memberNo=21#.Viu0YeorKRs (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
63 E-mail from Kap-You (Kevin) Kim, Partner, Bae Kim & Lee LLC, to Gilles Cuniberti, Professor 
of Private Int’l Law, Univ. of Lux. (Apr. 14, 2015) (on file with author). 
64 Id.  See also People:  Byung-Chol (B.C.) Yoon, Representative Work, KIM & CHANG, http:// 
www.kimchang.com/home/bcyoon#Representative%20Work (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) [hereinafter 
Yoon] (stating that another leading Korean lawyer,  Byung-Chol (B.C.) Yoon, was involved in an ICDR 
case between a U.S. party and a Korean party with a seat in Seoul, Korea where Korean law was the 
applicable substantive law). 
65 See Michael J. Moser, JP: Experience, MICHAEL MOSER, http://www.michaelmoser.com/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
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majority of Asian ICDR arbitrations are seated in the United States and 
involve one U.S. party.66
The ICDR has also published a few arbitral awards.67  Those 
involving Asian parties all had their seat in the United States and most 
involved a U.S. party.68  
The fact that the vast majority of ICDR arbitrations involving Asian 
parties concern disputes between Asian and U.S. parties and have their seat 
in the United States strongly suggests that, in the vast majority of these 
cases, the parties will have chosen the law of a U.S. state to govern their 
contract.  The first reason is that parties to international transactions often 
find it natural to select the same jurisdiction as the seat of the arbitration and 
the applicable substantive law.  The second reason is that the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract favored resolving disputes with an 
American arbitration institution and a seat in the Unites States.  This could 
reveal that the U.S. party had a strong bargaining power.  It could also reveal 
that the nexus of the transaction was in the United States and that it appeared 
natural to all parties to choose U.S. arbitration.  Finally, the contract could 
have involved the U.S. subsidiary of the Asian party and thus was treated as 
a domestic transaction.  Whatever the circumstances, it is likely that if such 
circumstances led the parties to choose ICDR arbitration in the United 
States, they also led them to choose U.S. state law to govern their contract. 
Experienced practitioners confirm the hypothesis that the parties 
provide for the application of the law of a U.S. state in the vast majority of 
ICDR arbitrations involving Asian parties.  Mr. Hough explained that, in all 
the ICDR arbitrations involving an Asian party to which he had been a 
participant, the substantive law chosen by the parties was the law of a U.S. 
state (New York or California).  When asked whether he thought this would 
be the case in the vast majority of ICDR arbitrations involving Asian parties, 
he wrote that he believed so.69  Likewise, Dr. Moser wrote that his personal 
experience has been that, in the vast majority of ICDR arbitrations involving 
                                                   
66 E-mail from Dr. Michael J. Moser, sole practitioner, to Gilles Cuniberti, Professor of Private Int’l 
Law, Univ. of Lux. (June 25, 2015) (on file with author). 
67 ICDR AWARDS & COMMENTARIES (G. Hanessian ed., 2012). 
68 Id. at 99 (ICDR Case no 152-04, involving parties from the United States and India seated in New 
York), 155 (ICDR Case no 251-04, involving parties from New York and China seated in New York), 209 
(ICDR Case no 379-04, involving parties from Taiwan and Korea seated in New York), 225 (ICDR Case 
no 526-04, involving one party from China and a party of unreported nationality and seated in 
Washington). 
69 E-mail from James E. Hough, Partner, Morrison Foerster, to Gilles Cuniberti, Professor of Private 
Int’l Law, Univ. of Lux. (Feb. 24, 2015) (on file with author). 
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Asian parties, the law governing the contract is a US law.70  Finally, in Mr. 
Kim’s opinion, the substantive law chosen by the parties in most ICDR 
arbitrations involving Asian parties was the law of a U.S. state.71  However, 
in the few ICDR arbitrations with a seat outside of the United States in 
which he was involved, the parties had chosen Asian laws.72  This 
hypothesis also is confirmed by the few awards involving Asian parties that 
the ICDR has published.73  In the absence of any contrary evidence, I 
conclude that parties to ICDR arbitrations involving Asian parties and a U.S. 
seat overwhelmingly choose U.S. laws to govern their contracts. 
While there is no evidence that these parties choose non-U.S. laws, 
such a conclusion could appear to be inconsistent with the data gathered by 
the three other major Asian arbitration institutions.  U.S. laws are virtually 
never chosen in cases going to SIAC or HKIAC and are chosen less often 
than English law in ICC arbitration.  The most convincing explanation for 
these differences is that the circumstances characterizing Asian ICDR 
arbitrations are simply not present in cases going to other institutions.  There 
are significantly more U.S. parties in the ICDR than in SIAC, HKIAC, and 
Asian ICC arbitrations combined.74  This itself is evidence that ICDR is the 
preferred arbitration institution for U.S. parties.  If this is correct, it suggests 
that agreements selecting ICDR arbitration reveal the U.S. party’s strong 
bargaining power while agreements selecting any other arbitral institution 
indicate that the U.S. party’s bargaining power was either lower or 
comparable to that of the other party. 
Table 17:  Number of U.S. Parties in Asian Arbitrations
2011 2012 
SIAC HKIAC ICC Total SIAC HKIAC ICC Total
U.S. parties 11 15 155 x 
0.2 = 
31 




ICDR cases 174 237 
                                                   
70 E-mail from Dr. Michael Moser, supra note 66. 
71 E-mail from Kap-You Kim, supra note 63. 
72 Id.  (In one case, the seat was Singapore and the substantive law was Indonesian; in another, the 
seat was Japan and the substantive law was Japanese.).  See also Yoon, supra note 64. 
73  See ICDR AWARDS & COMMENTARIES, supra note 67, at 99 (ICDR Case no 152–04, seated in 
New York, choice of the laws of New York and Massachusetts), 155 (ICDR Case no 251–04, seated in 
New York, choice of New York law), 209 (ICDR Case no 379–04, seat in New York, choice of 
Massachusetts law), 225 (ICDR Case no 526–04, seated in Washington, choice of Washington law). 
74 See infra Table 17. 
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For the purpose of this article, I therefore assume that in 80–90% of 
ICDR cases involving Asian parties, the law chosen by the parties was the 
law of a U.S. state.  I further assume that, in the few cases where this is not 
the case, the law of the Asian party would have been chosen.75  Since the 
most represented Asian nationalities in ICDR arbitration are Japanese, 
Indian, and Australian,76 the assumption is that the law of one of these three 
jurisdictions would typically be selected.   
B. Analysis of Aggregate Data 
The aggregate data of all four institutions reveal that, despite the 
varied origin of commercial parties operating in Asia, parties to Asian 
arbitrations generally choose one of three laws to govern their transactions:  
U.S. law, English law, and Singaporean law.  Combined, these three laws 
represent almost 85% of all choice of law selections in Asian arbitrations.  
No other law is chosen in more than 5% of the cases. 
Table 18: Laws Chosen in Asian International Arbitrations: Aggregate Results 
(Cases)
2011 2012 
SIAC HKIAC ICC ICDR Total SIAC HKIAC ICC ICDR Total
English 
law 
31 111 19 0 161 31 122 30 0 183










69 0 5 0 74 76 2 9 0 87
Hong 
Kong law 
2 66 - 44
= 22 
2 0 26 0 84 - 62 
= 22 
8 0 30
Indian law 2 0 9 2 13 14 5 14 2 34
Indonesian 
law 
6 0 3 0 9 6 0 5 0 11 
PRC’s law 2 8 5 0 15 3 27 3 0 33 
                                                   
75 Yoon, supra note 64 (anecdotal evidence confirms this assumption). 
76 See supra Table 12. 
60 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 1 
The prevalence of U.S., English, and Singaporean law varies by 
arbitral institution.  It originates from essentially one single institution for 
U.S. laws (ICDR) and Singapore law (SIAC), while English law is very 
successful in three out of the four major Asian institutions. 
U.S. laws dominate transactions going to ICDR arbitration;  however, 
they are virtually never chosen in transactions going to other Asian arbitral 
institutions.  Though this conclusion is not based on actual data for the 
methodological difficulties mentioned before, it rests on credible 
assumptions.  That being said, however credible they may be, they 
nonetheless remain assumptions. 
The choice of Singapore law generally originates from cases going to 
SIAC arbitration.  Singapore law seems to benefit a great deal from the 
success of SIAC as an arbitral center.  In Europe, Swiss contract law also 
benefits strongly from the success of the country as an arbitral venue.  
Switzerland’s success as an arbitral hub is corroborated, as far as the Swiss 
arbitration institution is concerned, by the frequency with which parties 
choose Swiss law and Switzerland as the seat of the arbitration—more than 
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70% of the cases.77  While the same is likely true for ICC arbitration, there is 
only indirect evidence supporting this conclusion.78  Singapore law 
dominates SIAC arbitration, but it is rarely chosen as governing law in ICC 
arbitration, though Singapore is the preferred Asian seat in ICC arbitration.79  
It seems, therefore, that Singapore law benefits from SIAC rather than from 
its attractiveness as an arbitral venue. 
Finally, the success of English law is more widespread than that of its 
two competitors.  English law completely dominates HKIAC arbitration.  It 
is also the most chosen law in ICC arbitration involving Asian parties—
though U.S. laws are a close second—and the second most often chosen law 
in SIAC arbitration, after Singapore law. 
IV. ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF CONTRACT LAWS 
IN ASIA
International contracts, whether assisted by a lawyer or not, are 
typically concluded by parties based in different jurisdictions.  Each knows 
the contract law of his particular jurisdiction but typically does not know the 
law of other jurisdictions, including the law of the other party’s jurisdiction.  
Parties would, therefore, prefer to submit their contract to their own law not 
only to avoid the additional costs associated with learning a foreign law, but 
also because it is psychologically more comfortable to apply familiar law to 
their business relationships.80  
However, in international contracts involving parties from different 
jurisdictions, it is not possible to satisfy all parties in this respect.  Rather, 
the parties must settle on one of two solutions.  The first is to choose the law 
of one of the parties.  In doing so, parties may be motivated by reasons 
unrelated to the perceived quality of the chosen law.  For example, one party 
may have greater bargaining power and thus simply be able to impose his 
own law for no reason other than it being familiar and, as such, more 
comfortable.  Alternatively, assuming this is a bilateral contract, the second 
solution would be to choose the law of a third jurisdiction unrelated to those 
of the contracting parties (“third-state law”).  Despite the fact that both 
parties have to shoulder the costs of learning a foreign law when this option 
                                                   
77 See SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARB. INST., ARBITRATION STATISTICS 2012 1 (2012), https://www.swiss 
arbitration.org/sa/download/statistics_2012.pdf. 
78 Cuniberti, supra note 7, at 480. 
79 See supra Table 9. 
80 See, e.g., Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition, supra note 14, at 23;  Gary Low, A Psychology of 
Choice of Laws, 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 363, 374 (2013). 
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is chosen, conventional wisdom suggests that parties select this option when 
they are unable to agree on either party’s national law.81  Indeed, in some 
situations, this solution is the only way to resolve an otherwise intractable 
issue.  If so, selection of a third-state law is driven by purely negative 
circumstances:  neither party wants the law of the other to apply.  However, 
once that negative decision is made, the choice of which third-state law 
becomes a positive choice:  the parties agree on a third-state law that is 
attractive to both of them.  A highly attractive foreign law might even 
convince efficiency-minded parties to choose it if they believe that it will 
result in important benefits that outweigh the associated costs.    One such 
benefit could be that the third-state law is perceived as superior to either 
party’s national law. 
My thesis, therefore, is that the attractiveness of a given country’s 
contract law can be assessed by determining the number of cases in which it 
is chosen as a third-state law.  Of course, it is possible that a party to a given 
transaction would choose the law of the other because both are convinced of 
the qualities of that law.  However, it is impossible to distinguish such cases 
from those in which the choice would have been dictated by the stronger 
bargaining power of one of the parties.  Furthermore, if the law of one of the 
parties appears as attractive to the other, it should also appear so to parties to 
other unrelated transactions and thus be chosen as a third state law.  It is 
highly unlikely that a given country’s contract law would only be attractive 
to parties originating from the relevant jurisdiction.  Thus, the number of 
cases where a given contract law is chosen as a third-state law should be a 
fair measure of the overall attractiveness of that particular contract law and 
represent its minimum international attractiveness.
In order to assess whether parties to international contracts choose one 
of their own laws or a third-state law, the following methodology is applied.  
Data on the nationalities of parties to international contracts and the law 
chosen are gathered.  The minimum number of cases in which a given 
contract law was chosen as a third-state law is the difference between the 
cases where that law was chosen and the number of cases where one of the 
parties originated from the country of the said law.  When data on the latter 
are unavailable, I assume that most cases involved two parties and that, 
those cases being international and thus involving parties from different 
jurisdictions, the number of parties originating from one given jurisdiction is 
                                                   
81 See, e.g., Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition, supra note 14, at 24. 
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a reasonable proxy for the number of cases in which one party from that 
jurisdiction was involved. 
Below, I apply this methodology to the data provided by the four 
Asian arbitration institutions that are the focus of my study and calculate the 
international attractiveness of English, U.S., Singapore, and Hong Kong law.  
I also calculate the international attractiveness of Swiss, French, and German 
law because these three laws are among the five laws that are often chosen 
as third-state laws in ICC arbitration.82
A. Assessment of International Attractiveness in Each Arbitral Center 
1. The Singapore International Arbitration Center 
SIAC provided me with data on choice of law and publishes data on 
the nationalities of parties.83  These two sets of data are analyzed to calculate 
the international attractiveness of seven laws.  The results appear in Table 
19. 
Table 19: Attractiveness of Contract Laws in SIAC Arbitration
2010 2011 2012 
 Chosen 
Law 
Parties Attract. Chosen 
Law 





33 2 31 31 39/1584 16 31 1  30  
Switzerland 0 3 -3 0 7 -7 1-2 6  -4  
United 
States 
1 13 -12 0 11 -11 1 25  -24  
France 0 2 -2 0 0 0 2 3  -1 
Germany 0 2 -2 0 1 -1 2 4  -2 
Singapore  69 107 – 
26 x 2 
36 69 79 – 
37 x 2 
64 76 146 – 
36 x 2 
2 
Hong Kong 0 26 -26 2 23 -21 0 18  -18 
                                                   
82 Cuniberti, supra note 7, at 472. 
83 See SIAC, 2010 REPORT, supra note 27;  SIAC, 2011 REPORT, supra note 27;  SIAC, 2012
REPORT, supra note 27; SIAC, 2013 REPORT, supra note 27 (with respect to Singapore, SIAC Annual 
Reports do not distinguish between parties involved in domestic and international arbitration.  I thus 
subtract from the number of Singaporean parties twice the number of domestic arbitrations). 
84 The figure for 2011 is 39.  However, one single investment dispute involved 25 of them.  See 2011
CEO’S ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 6 (for the purpose of this article, 15 is thus a more meaningful 
figure). 
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2. The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
HKIAC provided me with data on both choice of law and nationalities 
of the parties.  These two sets of data are analyzed and used to calculate the 
attractiveness of the same seven laws.  The results appear in Table 20. 
Table 20:  Attractiveness of Contract Laws in HKIAC Arbitration
2011 2012 
 Chosen Law Parties Attract. Chosen Law Parties Attract. 
United Kingdom 111 1 110 122 6 116 
Switzerland 1 1 0 0 7 -7 
United States 9 15 -6 4 8 -4 
France 0 3 -3 0 0 0 
Germany 0 1 -1 2 8 -6 
Singapore 0 14 -14 2 38 -36 
Hong Kong 66 – 44 = 22 100 – 44 x 2 
= 12 
10 84 – 62 = 22 179 – 62 x 2 
= 55 
-33 
3. The ICC International Court of Arbitration  
The ICC has long published data on both choice of law and the 
nationalities of parties but has not organized this information by region.  It 
provided data on choice of law broken down to cases involving at least one 
Asian party but not with the corresponding data on non-Asian nationalities 
in the relevant cases.  In order to determine the number of European or 
American parties involved in those cases, this article assumes, ceteris 
paribus, that parties from those regions are as likely to be involved in a 
transaction with an Asian party as with a party from another region of the 
world.  As ICC cases involving Asian parties represented respectively 20% 
and 22% of ICC cases in 2011 and 2012,85 this article assumes that the same 
percentage of European or American parties were involved in these cases.  
The results appear in Table 21. 
                                                   
85 There were respectively 163 and 169 ICC cases involving an Asian party in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively 796 and 759 cases filed with the ICC in 2011 and 2012.  See Int’l Ct. of Arb., 2011 Report, 
supra note 38; Int’l Ct. of Arb., 2012 Report, supra note 38 (cases involving an Asian party thus 
represented respectively 20.47% and 22.26% of the total in those two years). 
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Table 21:  Attractiveness of Contract Laws in Asian ICC Arbitration
2011  2012  
 Chosen 
Law 
Parties Attract. Chosen 
Law 
Parties Attract. 
United Kingdom 19 88 x 0.2 = 18 1 30  49 x 0.22 = 11 19 
Switzerland 8 65 x 0.2 = 13 -5 10  59 x 0.22 = 13 -3
United States  15 155 x 0.2 = 31 -16 11  145 x 0.22 = 32 -21 
France  0 144 x 0.2 = 29 -29 3 124 x 0.22 = 27 -24 
Germany 3 118 x 0.2 = 24 -21 5 132 x 0.22 = 29 -24
Singapore 5  13  -8 9  24 -15 
Hong Kong 2  11 -9 8  26 -18 
4. The International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
Finally, because the data on choice of law in ICDR arbitrations are 
unavailable, I have assumed that that all ICDR cases involved one U.S. party 
and that in 80–90% of cases, the parties had chosen the law of a U.S. state.  
The consequence of such assumptions is that ICDR cases are largely neutral 
for determining the attractiveness of contract laws in Asia.  The two 
assumptions essentially cancel each other out with respect to U.S. parties 
and the choice of U.S. laws since the vast majority of the cases, possibly all, 
involve one U.S. party and in the vast majority of the cases the parties chose 
the law of a U.S. state.  Furthermore, those cases likely do not involve any 
U.K., Swiss, French, or German parties.  As such, the law of these 
jurisdictions is unlikely to be chosen.  
The only impact of these ICDR cases relates to Singapore and Hong 
Kong law.  A small number of parties originating from each of these 
jurisdictions are involved each year in ICDR arbitrations.86  It is likely that, 
in most cases, the applicable law is the law of a U.S. state, but there is 
anecdotal evidence of ICDR cases where an Asian law was chosen as the 
governing law.87
ICDR data would probably reveal that the international attractiveness 
of U.S., Singapore, and Hong Kong laws is negative.  In the absence of any 
precise figures,88 I simply chose to omit the ICDR altogether for this reason. 
                                                   
86 See supra Table 12. 
87 See note 64 and accompanying text. 
88 The number of parties originating from Hong Kong and Singapore are known.  2011:  12 
parties from Hong Kong and 7 from Singapore.  2012:  11 parties from Hong Kong and 6 from Singapore.  
See supra Table 12. 
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B. Overall Attractiveness of Contract Laws in Asia 
The aggregate results of the international attractiveness of contract 
laws in Asia appear in Table 22.  They reveal that only one law has a 
positive international attractiveness in Asia:  English law.  In 2011, the 
international attractiveness of Singapore law was also positive, but it was 
negative in 2012.  All other laws have a negative international attractiveness.  
Table 22:  Attractiveness of Contract Laws in Asia:  Aggregate Results (Cases)
2011 2012 
SIAC HKIAC ICC Total SIAC HKIAC ICC Total
English law 16 110 1 127 30 116 19 165
U.S. laws -11 -6 -16 -33 -24 -4 -21 -49
Swiss law -7 0 -5 -12 -4 -7 -3 -14
French law 0 -3 -29 -32 -1 0 -24 -25 
German law -1 -1 -21 -24 -2 -6 -24 -32 
Hong Kong 
law 
-21 10 -9 -20 -18 -33 -18 -69 
Singapore 
law 
64 -14 -8 42 2 -36 -15 -49
These results suggest that the domination of English law over the 
Asian market for third-state laws is absolute.  When parties to Asian 
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business transactions look for a third-state law, they almost uniformly 
choose English law.  In this market, English law simply has no competitor.  
The results are so straightforward that they minimize the impact of the 
assumptions that are necessary to make these calculations.  The only 
exception might be Singapore law.  However, the present study does not 
allow any definitive conclusions on this issue given the disparate results 
between the international attractiveness of Singapore law in 2011 and 2012.  
Of course, as previously noted, this does not mean that all Asian 
business transactions are governed by English law.  Only about one-third 
are.89  The other two-thirds are governed by various laws, typically, the law 
of one of the parties to the transaction.  In particular, one-third of Asian 
business transactions are governed by U.S. law.  However, since one of the 
parties is typically a U.S. company, the most convincing explanation for this 
choice is likely not the perceived quality of U.S. laws in Asia, but rather the 
relative bargaining power of the U.S. party.  If U.S. laws were attractive in 
Asia, the combination of U.S. economic power and the attractiveness of U.S. 
laws should have resulted in a greater share of Asian business transactions 
being governed by U.S. laws and, in particular, greater success in the 
number of transactions going to SIAC or HKIAC.  To the contrary, the fact 
that parties to SIAC and HKIAC proceedings virtually never choose U.S. 
laws suggests that its international attractiveness is limited.  
In conclusion, it seems that parties to Asian business transactions 
choose either English or U.S. laws for very different reasons.  Choice of 
U.S. laws appears to be the function of the success of U.S. corporations.  
U.S. laws are not chosen for any inherent superiority, real or perceived; they 
are chosen because U.S. companies demand it.  By contrast, English law is 
overwhelmingly chosen in transactions that do not involve any English 
party.  It is thus chosen for itself, and it is essentially the only one in Asia to 
be chosen for this reason. 
This difference is important from an economic perspective.  Choosing 
the law of a given jurisdiction to govern a contract brings business to 
lawyers admitted to practice the law of that jurisdiction, whether at the 
concluding stages of contract formation or during any subsequent disputes 
that arise.  Both English and U.S. lawyers benefit from the fact that their 
laws are often chosen in Asian business transactions.  For U.S. lawyers, the 
U.S. economy drives this additional stream of business and U.S. corporate 
                                                   
89 See supra Chart 2. 
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activity in Asia (or Asian corporate activities in the U.S.).  By contrast, for 
English lawyers, the source of this additional business is the attractiveness of 
English law.  This means that, remarkably, the English legal profession 
generates its own business regardless of the economic activity of English 
corporations or businesses.  
V. EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF ENGLISH LAW 
IN ASIA
The prevailing myth is that of two titans, New York and English laws, 
clashing over dominance of the global legal market.  My study debunks this 
misconception, suggesting that, at least in Asia, English law is the only titan:  
the Cronus that dwarfs and engulfs competing laws.  While U.S. laws govern 
a significant number of Asian business transactions, they are chosen in 
transactions involving U.S. parties and thus seem to benefit from the might 
of the U.S. economy rather than their own attractiveness.  
Below, I seek to explain the remarkable success of English law in 
Asia.  Intuitively, one would think that parties to international commercial 
transactions are typically sophisticated actors, and therefore the choice of a 
given law should reveal that this law affords rules which are better suited to 
the interests of these international commercial actors.  I first explore whether 
certain substantive aspects of English law might explain its attractiveness. 
There are, however, a number of factors other than the intrinsic 
qualities of specific contract laws which could influence the choice of law in 
international contracts.  In the Asian context, one is particularly convincing:  
the presence of international firms.  I turn to these factors next. 
A. Substantive Differences 
The most important factor contributing to the international 
attractiveness of a particular contract law ought to be its intrinsic qualities.  
All other things being equal, international parties should prefer the law that 
best fits their needs.    Thus, one would expect the most attractive contract 
laws to be the best thereof, at least from the perspective of the parties.  
Below, I explore whether certain qualities of English law could explain its 
success, highlighting the ways it differs from New York state law.90
                                                   
90 I have already explored differences between English law and the laws of civil law jurisdictions, in 
particular Swiss law, in a previous article.  See Cuniberti, supra note 7, at 497−500. 
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At the outset, it is important to note that comparing the contract laws 
of two sophisticated jurisdictions such as England and New York is a 
delicate exercise.  Commercial transactions are very diverse.  They can be 
governed by general contract law or special rules applicable only to certain 
types of contracts.    It is possible that the disparate attractiveness of the two 
laws varies depending on the particular type of contract under scrutiny.  The 
nature of the data from Asian arbitral centers does not allow for distinctions 
between different kinds of contracts.  Yet, when the English and the New 
York legal professions issued brochures marketing the contract law of their 
respective jurisdictions,91 they chose to remain at a surprisingly high level of 
generality.  This suggests that the drafters were not aware of any critical 
differences unique to particular kinds of contracts.  
One obvious reason to prefer one law over another is the existence of 
mandatory rules prohibiting certain types of contract clauses or even certain 
types of transaction altogether.  Commercial parties can be expected to avoid 
contract laws that contain such restrictions and to gravitate towards more 
liberal ones.  Therefore, it could be that some types of transactions or 
particular contract terms are authorized under English law, while forbidden 
under many other laws.92  This is certainly the general claim made by the 
Law Society of England and Wales in marketing materials issued in 2007.93  
Despite the general claims made by advocates of English law, it is unclear 
whether it is significantly more liberal than the commercial laws of other 
liberal states.  In particular, I am unable to identify differences in this respect 
between New York and English law. 
Logically, once parties to commercial transactions have determined 
that their contract will be found valid and enforceable in the relevant 
competent jurisdiction, one would presume their next concern would be 
performance thereunder.  Thus, the rules applicable to the interpretation and 
performance of commercial contracts should be of critical importance.  
When parties conclude a commercial contract, the expectation is that they 
                                                   
91 L. SOC’Y OF ENG. & WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE JURISDICTION OF CHOICE (2007), 
http://www.eversheds.com/documents/LawSocietyEnglandAndWalesJurisdictionOfChoice.pdf;  N.Y. ST.
BAR ASS’N, CHOOSE NEW YORK LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (2012), 
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Dispute_Resolution/Dispute_Resolution_PDFs/Choose_New_York_Law_
For_International_Commercial_Transactions.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
92 It is important to note that I am only discussing mandatory contract rules.  Many other regulatory 
regimes are irrelevant for our purposes because their territorial scope of application is left untouched by 
choice of law clauses.  Competition law, for example, regulates transactions without regard to which 
contract law is chosen by the parties to govern their contract. 
93 See L. SOC’Y OF ENG. & WALES, supra note 91. 
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will agree on a law that will strictly enforce its specific terms.  Similarly, 
although the issue is hotly debated among legal scholars,94 it is reasonable to 
assume that commercial parties want the language of their contract to be 
taken seriously and, thus, any interpretation thereof to be as literal as 
possible.  Conversely, one could expect that contract laws that allow a court 
to rewrite provisions of negotiated contracts and to otherwise assess the 
fairness of their terms will be viewed with a high level of scrutiny. 
These assumptions and hypotheses were empirically tested by 
Geoffrey Miller95 on the basis of data gathered in a study that he conducted 
with Theodore Eisenberg of 2,800 U.S. commercial contracts.96  Miller and 
Eisenberg’s study revealed that U.S. commercial parties chose New York 
state law in 46% of their contracts and California state law in only 8% of 
them.97  Miller then set about comparing New York and California state law 
on a wide range of issues, finally concluding that the essential difference 
between the two could be found in their respective rules on interpretation 
and enforcement of contracts.  While Miller characterized New York state 
judges as “formalists” with “little tolerance for attempts to rewrite contracts 
to make them fairer or more equitable” and found that they “look[ed] at the 
written agreement as the definitive source of interpretation,” Miller asserted 
that California judges “more willingly reform or reject contracts in the 
service of morality or public policy;  they place less emphasis on the written 
agreement of the parties and seek instead to identify the contours of their 
commercial relationship within a broader context framed by principles of 
reason, equity and substantial justice.”98  American scholars cite Miller’s 
study as evidence that commercial parties prefer “formalist” or “textualist” 
contract laws (i.e., laws strictly enforcing the contract’s agreed-upon terms 
and relying on “plain meaning” rules of interpretation).99
English law has also traditionally been perceived as textualist with 
judges strictly enforcing contractual obligations.  English law places strong 
emphasis on written agreements, following an objective approach with 
respect to the determination of contractual terms and to contract 
                                                   
94 Compare Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 927 
(2010) with STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009). 
95 See Miller, Bargains Bicoastal, supra note 3. 
96 See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 3, at 1475. 
97 Id. at 1490. 
98 Miller, Bargains Bicoastal, supra note 3, at 1478. 
99 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 94, at 957. 
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interpretation.100  The intent of the parties is to be determined principally 
through objective criteria such as the language used by the parties rather 
than under subjective criteria.101  In this respect, the English parole evidence 
rule, which excludes the use of extrinsic evidence to add to, vary, or 
contradict the plain meaning of the written terms of a contract, is key102 and 
was presented by Lord Hobhouse as “one of the main reasons for the 
international success of English law.”103
English law also favors a formalist approach to contract interpretation.    
Interpretation focuses on the language in the document itself.  English law 
does not typically allow the consideration of pre-execution negotiations104 or 
the manner in which performance has been rendered post-execution105 to 
determine the meaning of contractual clauses.  That is not to say that English 
courts inevitably interpret contracts in a formal, literal manner.  Although 
the general rule is that words should be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning, it has long been accepted that drafting mistakes can be made.106  In 
such circumstances, a contextual interpretation is necessary, focusing on 
how reasonable commercial actors would construe the contract, rather than 
on how the particular actors might have interpreted it.107  More importantly, 
English courts are not easily convinced that the drafted language in a written 
contract did not, in fact, represent the intent of the parties at the time of 
execution, such that a resort to contextual interpretation is required.108
There is, however, an important difference between New York law 
and English law.  English law has always rejected the duty of good faith in 
both the formation and performance of contracts.109  By contrast, New York 
was the first U.S. jurisdiction to adopt the implied covenant of good faith 
                                                   
100 See generally JOHN CARTWRIGHT, CONTRACT LAW:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH LAW OF 
CONTRACT FOR THE CIVIL LAWYER 96 (2nd ed., 2013). 
101 Id., at 62.  See also Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38 [39], [2009] 3 
WLR 267. 
102 See generally NEIL ANDREWS, CONTRACT LAW 405 (2011). 
103 Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [49]. 
104 See, e.g., Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 (HL); Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38 
at [38] 
105 See, e.g., L. Schuler AG v . Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd. [1974] AC 235, [252] (HL). 
106 See, e.g., Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Bldg. Soc’y [1997] UKHL 28. 
107 Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR at [1384]; Mannai Investments Co. Ltd. v. Eagle Star Life Assurance 
Co. Ltd. [1997] AC 749 (HL).  In recent years, the U.K. highest court has adopted such a purposive 
approach in a number of cases.  See, e.g., Chartbrook Ltd, Re Sigma Fin. Corp. [2009] UKSC 2 (in 
Chartbrook Ltd, for instance, Lord Hoffmann held that as the literal meaning of a clause would make 
certain other provisions in the agreement appear arbitrary and irrational, the business purpose of the clause 
should be considered to interpret it). 
108 See, e.g., Investors Compensation Scheme, [1997] UKHL 28. 
109 CARTWRIGHT, supra note 100, at 61. 
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and fair dealing in its common law of contract.110  The rule also appears in 
the version of the Uniform Commercial Code that New York adopted in 
1962.111  Advocates of New York law explain that the duty of good faith 
“protects the fruits of a party’s bargain”112 and make New York law “stand 
in an interesting ‘middle’ position between the civil law, on the one hand, 
and English law, on the other.”113    However, when confronted with 
criticism that good faith leads to uncertainty, those same advocates insist 
that “in the case of New York, it is clear that the principle of good faith has 
been handled very cautiously and with great discretion,”114 and that “in an 
age where more and more contracts between commercial parties are written 
with the assistance of counsel, the need and inclination of New York courts 
to use the covenant for the purpose of essentially supplementing or revising 
contracts can be said to have waned.”115  
A careful study of New York cases might reveal that the duty of good 
faith has little impact on New York’s strict adherence to the written terms of 
commercial agreements.  It is unlikely, however, that commercial parties in 
Asia or elsewhere in the world would conduct such a study prior to deciding 
between English or New York law.  The perceptions of businessmen116 of 
the qualities of various laws, if any, would almost certainly be based on 
simple propositions.    One such proposition might be that New York law 
recognizes the duty of good faith while English law does not, and thus 
English law will more strictly enforce commercial agreements.  
If this conclusion were correct, it would mean that the relevance of 
Eisenberg and Miller’s study should be considered as limited to U.S 
domestic transactions.  The success of New York law in U.S. domestic 
transactions would be explained by the lack of more textualist competitors 
on the U.S. market.  In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.  
A number of American lawyers have offered an alternative theory to 
the impact of the existence of the duty of good faith on the international 
attractiveness of New York law.  They argue that, as the duty of good faith is 
                                                   
110 See MICHAEL W. GALLIGAN, CHOOSING NEW YORK LAW AS GOVERNING LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 9 (2012). 
111 U.C.C. § 2−103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001). 
112 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N, supra note 91, at 9. 
113 GALLIGAN, supra note 110, at 8. 
114 Id. at 11. 
115 Id. at 9. 
116 Of course, parties could be assisted by counsel, but the involvement of lawyers in the negotiation 
of an international contract raises an agency problem that I address below in Section C. 
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found in many civil law jurisdictions and international instruments such as 
the CISG, it is the international norm and parties originating from such 
countries would rather choose a law that conforms to, rather than deviate 
from, such a standard.117  In their opinion, strict adherence to a purely 
formalist approach to contract construction might lead to a “disproportionate 
allocation of risks that the parties may well not have contemplated.”118  The 
results of my study contradict this theory, at least with respect to Asia. 
B. Colonial Empire 
A factor contributing to the attractiveness of English law in Asia 
might be the fact that a number of Asian jurisdictions are former British 
colonies.  As such, many of these colonies have modeled their laws on 
English law.  Not only did they become common law jurisdictions, but they 
often follow the case law of England’s highest court, the House of Lords 
(now the U.K. Supreme Court).  Indeed, until recently, a last recourse to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the Queen of England, 
dominated by senior English judges, was available to litigants in all of these 
jurisdictions.119  As a result, although English precedents are not binding in 
these jurisdictions, they are very often cited as authoritative and typically 
followed.  The contract laws of Hong Kong, Singapore, and, to a lesser 
extent, Australia are very close to English contract law.  Because courts in 
these countries are not strictly bound by English precedent, their law may 
have evolved slightly differently.  But the big picture is that the laws of all 
these jurisdictions are quite similar, and that a lawyer trained in any of these 
countries would be very comfortable in practicing in others. 
In Singapore, for instance, the Application of English Law Act of 
1993 provides that “the common law of England (including principles and 
                                                   
117 GALLIGAN, supra note 110, at 32;  Michelle F. Herman & Nick J. Xu, Choosing Between 
New York and English Law in Chinese Aviation Agreements, MONDAQ (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.monda
q.com/x/211636/Aviation/Advice+on+Practical+Problems+for+Aviation+in+Asia; Paul Cohen & Gabrielle 
Farina, Rue Britannia: Why English Law Is A Poor Choice For International Commercial Arbitration, 




118 GALLIGAN, supra note 110, at 30.   See also Cohen & Farina, supra note 117 (arguing that English 
law is backward and that parties would prefer a more nuanced doctrine of contractual interpretation). 
119 Recourse to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the Queen was opened both in 
criminal and civil matters.  It was eventually abolished in Australia in 1986, in Singapore in 1994 and in 
Hong Kong in 1997.  It remains available for a number of Commonwealth countries.  See THE JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/beginners-guide-to-the-jcpc.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
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rules of Equity) . . . shall continue to be in force in Singapore . . . so far as it 
is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants and 
subject to such modifications as those circumstances may require.”120  In the 
field of contract law, there have been some departures from English law,121
but Singapore courts regularly state that there should not be departure from 
received English law for its own sake122 and that, in the commercial context, 
there is greater likelihood and desirability for uniformity.123  As a 
consequence, “much of Singapore contract law is consistent with the 
prevailing English law.”124
The implications of the existence of this English common law 
community are many.  The first, which will be developed below,125 is that 
lawyers trained in England, Australia, Singapore, or Hong Kong are 
essentially interchangeable and thus transferable between these jurisdictions.  
This explains why so many lawyers in Singapore or Hong Kong were 
educated in other British common law jurisdictions, in particular England 
and Australia. 
Second, for parties originating from any of these jurisdictions, English 
law is not genuinely foreign law.  In international negotiations where the 
other party would not be willing to accept their law, English law would 
appear as a great second best option.  This would be obvious where all 
parties originate from former English colonies.126  Even in transactions 
involving only one such party, one could predict that it would propose 
English law first, and that the offer might be accepted in a significant 
number of cases.127
                                                   
120 Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed) § 3. 
121 ANDREW B.L. PHANG & GOH YIHAN, CONTRACT LAW IN SINGAPORE 65 (2012). 
122 See CHS CPO GmBH (in bankruptcy) and Another v. Vikas Goel and Others [2005] 3 SLR 202, at 
[87] (Sing.). 
123 See Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v. Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR 663, at [133] (Sing.). 
124 ANDREW B.L. PHANG & GOH YIHAN, supra note 120, at 66.
125 See infra Part C of this section. 
126 For anecdotal evidence, see Award of 2008 in ICC case no 14269 (parties from Hong Kong and 
Singapore, choice of English law and Swiss seat of arbitration).  See also Award of 2000 in ICC case no 
10228, 21 ICC BULLETIN 61, 61−62 (2010) (“In considering the matter, I think it is perfectly possible that a 
Cypriot party, whose law closely has followed the law of England and a party from a British Colony would 
quite naturally wish to apply English law, especially as the other possibilities—French, Swiss and 
Ukrainian—would probably be quite unknown, but known to be different from the law they were used 
to.”). 
127 For anecdotal evidence, see Award of 1999 in ICC case no 9594, 12 ICC BULLETIN 73 (2001) 
(parties from Spain and India, choice of English law and English seat of arbitration). 
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There is no doubt that parties originating from jurisdictions that 
closely follow English law represent a significant percentage of the parties 
involved in the arbitration proceedings that are the focus of this article.  In 
ICC arbitrations, parties originating from India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia represented 36% and 43% of all Asian parties involved in ICC 
arbitrations in 2011 and 2012.128  Likewise, in ICDR arbitrations, parties 
originating from the same four jurisdictions, Australia, and New Zealand 
accounted for 48% and 46% of all Asian/Pacific parties involved in ICDR 
arbitrations in 2011 and 2012.129  Finally, in SIAC arbitrations, parties 
originating from the same six jurisdictions, Canada,130 the United Kingdom, 
and Samoa accounted for 34% and 44% of all parties involved in SIAC 
international proceedings in 2011 and 2012.131
However, it does not seem possible to establish any correlation 
between the number of parties originating from jurisdictions closely 
following English law and the number of cases where English law is chosen.  
While English law dominates in SIAC and ICC arbitrations, it clearly does 
not in ICDR arbitrations.  Yet, almost half of Asian/Pacific parties involved 
in ICDR arbitrations originate from jurisdictions that closely follow English 
law. 132
The influence of the origin of the parties to Asian business 
transactions on their choice of law preference remains unclear.  It might be 
that the feeling of belonging to a wider legal community has waned in some 
jurisdictions, and only remains strong in others.  It might also be that this 
factor only plays a minor role compared to other factors. 
                                                   
128 2011:  110 parties out of 303; 2012:  128 parties out of 299.  See supra Table 10.  The nationality 
of non-Asian parties to these proceedings is unknown. 
129 2011:  113 parties out of 243; 2012:  96 parties out of 208.  See supra Table 12.  The nationality of 
non-Asian/Pacific parties to these proceedings is unknown. 
130 It is assumed that Canadian parties to SIAC arbitrations are more likely to come from Common 
Law Canada than from Quebec. 
131 2011:  88 parties (including 5 from Singapore, 15 from the U.K., and 2 from Canada) out of 254; 
2012: 158 parties (including 74 from Singapore and 1 from the U.K.) out of 356.  See supra Tables 3 and 4. 
132 In addition, although it is not possible to identify trends by analyzing data for two years only, it is 
interesting to note the two following evolutions.  While the share of parties originating from British 
common law jurisdictions in SIAC arbitrations increased between 2011 and 2012 (from 34% to 44%), the 
share of English law actually decreased during the same period (from 24% to 19%).  See supra Table 13. 
 To the contrary, in ICC arbitrations, the share of parties originating from British common law jurisdictions 
increased between 2011 and 2012 (from 36% to 43%), and so did the share of English law, which increased 
as well (from 11% to 17%).  See supra Table 16. 
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C. Reach of Law Firms 
When counsel is involved in the selection of an international 
commercial contract’s governing law, an obvious agency problem is created, 
as lawyers are self-interested in the final choice.  This is because lawyers 
will typically be admitted to practice the law of one country and will 
therefore have the possibility to advise clients only if this law is applicable.  
Thus, when a client is faced with the issue of choosing the law governing an 
international contract, lawyers have a strong incentive to see the parties 
agree on the application of the law they practice.  If they do, the lawyers will 
be able to advise the client on the validity and enforceability of the contract 
and might be consulted in the future should any issue arise between the 
parties.  By contrast, if the parties provide for the application of any other 
law, the lawyer will lose this opportunity with respect to the particular 
transaction in the short and in the long term.  It is therefore reasonable to 
expect lawyers to advise their clients to provide for the application of their 
law, irrespective of whether another law might be better suited to the needs 
of their client. 
It would be wrong to think that such agency problems do not exist in 
international firms.  For any given lawyer, the fact that a law other than the 
one he or she practices is made applicable by client choice in a contractual 
negotiation means that he or she will lose business to another lawyer, even if 
the lawyer works in another office of the same firm.  Each of the two 
lawyers will likely have financial targets to meet and helping partners meet 
their own target does not improve one’s business or help to meet one’s own 
target.  Some international law firms have attempted to remedy this agency 
problem by granting some recognition to lawyers bringing business to others 
in the firm (client origination), but there is no evidence that such attempts 
have changed the overall situation.133  
The interest of lawyers to see parties to international transactions 
choose the law that they practice raises the question of whether an important 
factor in the success of English law in Asia could be that there are simply far 
                                                   
133 According to the 2015 Global Partner Compensation System Survey of Edge International, client 
origination is “extremely important” in the determination of partners’ compensation in 60% of the U.S. law 
firms, but only in 25% of U.K. law firms. See http://www.edge.ai/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Edge-
Compensation-Survey_20150302.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). What is not known is whether it would 
be so important that a partner would equally consider keeping a case or forwarding it to another partner. 
Furthermore, the second most important factor remains personal performance, which likely translates into 
targets that each of the partners must still meet. 
JANUARY 2016 THE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 77 
more English lawyers involved in Asian international business transactions 
and, in particular, far more English lawyers than U.S. lawyers.  
There is no available data on the origin and profile of lawyers advising 
parties to Asian international business transactions.  Myriads of such 
transactions are concluded each day and unreported.  Data gathered by 
arbitral institutions would be enlightening, but these institutions do not 
report on the lawyers involved in the cases they handle and have even less 
information on the lawyers who drafted the contracts out of which the 
disputes arose.  A good proxy for determining the profile of lawyers 
advising parties to Asian international business transactions, however, is to 
study the profile of lawyers based in Asia.  Of course, lawyers assisting such 
parties need not be based in Asia.  Transactions linked to Asian investments 
directed to the United States or to Europe should logically involve lawyers 
of the place of the investment, i.e., lawyers based in the United States or in 
Europe.  Yet, for transactions with a strong nexus in Asia, it is likely that 
parties would seek lawyers with expertise in Asia.  While it is conceivable 
that lawyers with such expertise may be based outside of Asia, most would 
be found in Asia.  Furthermore, everything else being equal, Asian parties 
would probably prefer to hire a lawyer based in Asia rather than a lawyer 
based on the other side of the globe, if only for reasons of convenience, such 
as being in same time zone, the possibility of meeting in person, etc.  The 
growing number of international law firms with offices in major Asian 
centers also demonstrates that a significant part of Asian legal business is 
done in Asia.  
This article therefore assumes that the respective numbers of English 
and U.S. lawyers based in Asia would give interesting indications as to the 
profile of lawyers advising parties to Asian international business 
transactions.  Before presenting data on international lawyers practicing in 
Asia, a number of preliminary remarks are in order.  First, the practice of 
law is not open to foreign lawyers in all Asian jurisdictions.  India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand all have legal markets reserved to 
local lawyers where foreign lawyers may not practice.134  South Korea and 
Malaysia have only recently liberalized their legal markets.135  Aside from 
                                                   
134 See Advocates Act, No. 25 of 1961, INDIA CODE (1961); Law Relating to Advocates, No. 18 of 
2003, Indonesia (2003);  RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 138 § 2;  CONST. art. XII, §14 (Phil.);  FOREIGN 
BUSINESS ACT B.E. 2542 § 8 (1999) (Thai). 
135 See Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia, LEGAL PROFESSION (LICENSING OF 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS AND QUALIFIED FOREIGN LAW FIRMS AND REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN 
LAWYERS) RULES (ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CHAMBERS OF MALAYSIA 2014);  Jeanne Lee John, The Korus 
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Mainland China, international firms have primarily opened offices in 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan.  I therefore focus on these three 
jurisdictions.  Second, I assume that decisions to advise clients to provide for 
the application of a given law will only be made by partners or (of) counsels, 
and therefore exclude all other categories of lawyers from my inquiry.  
Third, I look at the primary legal education received by international lawyers 
based in Asia.  I assume that lawyers will, for the most part, practice the law 
in which they received this primary education and have incentives to 
advocate for this law to be chosen by their clients.  I therefore ignore 
graduate education in other countries and, in particular, ignore the fact that 
lawyers might have received an LL.M. from a U.S. law school.136  For 
instance, Japanese lawyers who received primary legal education in Japan 
and a U.S. LL.M. will practice Japanese law after returning to Japan and will 
then become partners, possibly in U.S. law firms, for the purpose of advising 
clients on Japanese law. 
Finally, it is important to again consider137 how similar the contract 
laws of Hong Kong, Singapore, and, to a lesser extent, Australia are to 
English law.  A lawyer trained in one of these jurisdictions can easily 
practice and advise in the law of any other of these jurisdictions.  This means 
that, for an Australia- or a Hong Kong-educated lawyer, the decision of a 
client to provide for the application of English law to his contract does not 
mean that he or she would be unable to continue to advise the client with 
respect to the relevant transaction.  This explains why many partners in 
Asian offices of U.K. law firms not only were educated in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, but also in Australia.  They certainly do not practice Australian 
law in Singapore or Hong Kong, but rather either English law or the local 
common law (i.e., Singapore or Hong Kong law).  For the purpose of this 
article, therefore, it is meaningless to distinguish between English-educated 
lawyers and lawyers educated in other British common law jurisdictions.  
When it comes to international business transactions, they all belong to the 
extended British common law family. 
                                                                                                                                                       
FTA on Foreign Law Firms and Attorneys in South Korea—A  Contemporary Analysis on Expansion into 
East Asia, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 237 (2012). 
136 I know from personal experience that while such degrees might be an important factor to be 
recruited in a foreign office of a U.S. firm, lawyers holding such degrees will then practice the law of the 
local jurisdiction where they are hired. 
137 See supra Part V. B (discussing colonial influence). 
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1. Singapore and Hong Kong 
The Singapore and Hong Kong international legal markets are 
dominated by English law firms.  According to Asian Legal Business,138 six 
of the ten biggest Singapore offices of international law firms and six of the 
ten biggest Hong Kong offices of international law firms are offices of 
English law firms.139    Two others in Singapore and one other in Hong Kong 
are offices of English firms that have merged with U.S. firms.140  
Unsurprisingly, offices of English law firms are staffed with British common 
law-educated lawyers.141
Remarkably, offices of U.S. law firms are also dominated by British 
common law-educated lawyers.  The biggest offices of U.S. firms in 
Singapore and in Hong Kong rely on British common law-educated 
professionals, who represent 65–95% of the partners based in Singapore and 
85–97% of the partners based in Hong Kong.  Some U.S. firms have a 
different model:  smaller offices with a bigger proportion of U.S.-educated 
partners, who then constitute about half of the partners based in the relevant 
Singapore office, but never more than 35% of the partners based in the 
relevant Hong Kong office.142
Table 23:  Education of Partners in Offices of Selected U.S. Law Firms in 
Singapore 
U.S. Law Firm British Common Law U.S. 
Baker & McKenzie, Wong & 
Leow 
25 1 
Jones Day 10 5 
Latham Watkins 11 3 
Morrison Foerster 3 4 
Sidley Austin 5 4 
                                                   
138 Asia’s Top 50 Largest Law Firms, ASIAN LEGAL BUSINESS (Nov. 2014), http://www.legal  
businessonline .com /features/asia%E2%80%99s-top-50-largest-law-firms/68885. 
139 Id.  The list of large English law firms in Hong Kong includes Clifford Chance, Linklaters, King 
& Wood Mallesons, Allen & Overy, Reed Smith Richards Butler, and Herbert Smith Freehills.
140 Id.  The English firms merged with U.S. firms that are active in Singapore are Norton Rose 
Fullbright and Hogan Lovells.  The English firm merged with a U.S. firm active in Hong Kong is 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Derringer. 
141 See infra Tables 23 & 26. 
142 See infra Tables 23 & 25. 
80 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 1 
Table 24:  Education of Partners in Seven of the Largest Offices of International 
Law Firms in Singapore143
Law Firm  British 
Common Law  
U.S.  Other 
Baker & McKenzie, Wong & Leow 25 1 
Clifford Chance 16 2
Norton Rose Fullbright 19
Allen & Overy 12
Linklaters 9 2 2
Jones Day 10 5 
Latham Watkins 11 3 
Table 25:  Education of Partners in Largest Offices of U.S. Law Firms in Hong 
Kong 
U.S. Law Firm  British 
Common Law  
U.S.  PRC  
Mayer Brown 59 1 1
Baker & McKenzie 52 7
DLA Piper 24 3 1
Jones Day 16 7 2
Latham Watkins 13 8 
Sidley Austin 15 5 
Morrison Foerster 7 5 2
Table 26:  Education of Partners in the Seven Largest Offices of International Law 
Firms in Hong Kong 
Law Firm  British 
Common 
Law  
U.S.  PRC  Other 
Mayer Brown 59 1 1  
Baker & McKenzie 52 7  3 
Clifford Chance 28 2 1 2 
Linklaters 24 2  2 
DLA Piper 24 3 1  
King & Wood Mallesons 14 4 2  
Allen & Overy 18 3   
In the seven biggest offices of international law firms in Singapore 
and in Hong Kong, 87% and 86% of the partners or counsels working in the 
relevant offices of the two cities received their education in a law school of 
the British common law world, i.e., essentially Singapore, Hong Kong, 
                                                   
143 Watson Farley and Williams and Herbert Smith Freehills are excluded from the inquiry because 
their websites do not report consistently on the education of the partners. 
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England, and Australia.144  The incentive for these lawyers to advise their 
clients to choose English, Singapore, or Hong Kong law over any other is 
obvious. 
2. Japan 
According to Asian Legal Business, the presence of American law 
firms in Japan is much higher than in the rest of Asia.145  The five largest 
offices of international firms in Japan are all offices of U.S. firms.  If one 
focuses on the number of partners—as opposed to fee-earners—U.S. firms 
represent the eight largest offices of international firms in Japan.  
Unlike Southeast Asia, offices of U.S. firms in Japan are staffed with 
U.S.-educated lawyers and Japanese lawyers.  They rarely have British 
common law-educated lawyers as partners.  By contrast, the partners at 
English firms are typically British common law-educated.146  As a result, 
there is roughly an equal number of U.S.-trained and British common law-
trained lawyers based in Japan.147
Table 27:  Education of Partners in the 14 Largest Offices of International Law 
Firms in Japan 





Baker & McKenzie 3 57 6 1
Morrison Foerster 29 25 0 0
Bingham McCutchen 1 33 0 0
White & Case 6 7 4 0
Jones Day 7 16 0 0
K&L Gates 3 6 0 1
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 5 6 0 0
Hogan Lovells 2 5 5 1
Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Derringer 0 7 5 0
Ashurst 1 1 7 0
Clifford Chance 0 4 4 0
Linklaters 0 5 3 0
Herbert Smith Freehills 0 0 6 0
Allen & Overy 0 1 6 0
Total 57 173 46 3
                                                   
144 See supra Tables 24 & 26. 
145 Asia’s Top 50 Largest Law Firms, supra note 138. 
146 See infra Table 27. 
147 See infra Chart 4. 
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An interesting question is whether there is a correlation between the 
high number of U.S. lawyers practicing in Japan and the choice of U.S. laws 
in international business transactions involving Japanese parties.  The 
question can be answered indirectly by noting that Japanese parties were the 
most represented parties in ICDR arbitration from 2010 until 2012, a close 
second in 2013,148 and that ICDR handles twice as many cases involving 
Japanese parties as the ICC, SIAC, and HKIAC combined.149  Between 2010 
and 2012, 49% of cases involving Japanese parties were handled by ICDR, 
while the ICC, SIAC, and HKIAC handled 20%, 7%, and 5% of such cases, 
respectively, and the Japanese arbitral institution (JCAA) 19%. 
                                                   
148 See supra Table 12. 
149 See infra Chart 5. 
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As previously explained,150 it is highly likely that, in the vast majority 
of ICDR cases involving Asian parties, the substantive law chosen by the 
parties was a U.S. law.  It follows that there indeed appears to be a 
correlation between the number of U.S. lawyers practicing in Japan and the 
number of transactions where parties chose a U.S. law as the applicable 
substantive law.  
Of course, it must be underscored that Japan and the United States are 
major economic partners.  According to the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service, which issues reports on U.S. direct investment abroad,151 Foreign 
direct investment in the United States,152 and U.S. International Trade153
each year, Japan has consistently received more U.S. direct investment 
(investment placed in holding companies excluded) than any other country 
of the Asia/Pacific region since 2008154 and has consistently spent far more 
direct investment in the United States than any other country of the 
Asia/Pacific region.  Furthermore, between 2007 and 2011, Japan has 
                                                   
150 Supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21118, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ABROAD:  TRENDS AND CURRENT ISSUES (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21118.pdf. 
152 See, e.g., JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21857, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES:  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21857.pdf. 
153 See, e.g., BROCK R. WILLIAMS & J. MICHAEL DONNELLY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33577, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE:  TRENDS AND FORECASTS, (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33577.pdf;  
DICK K. NANTO & J. MICHAEL DONNELLY, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE:  TRENDS AND FORECASTS, (2011), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/174192.pdf;  DICK K. NANTO, SHAYERAH ILIAS & J. MICHAEL 
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(2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/152627.pdf. 
154 China included:  China receives about half of the amounts invested in Japan.  In 2008, Australia 
ranked first, as it received slightly more U.S. investment than Japan (USD 74 billion against USD 73 
billion for Japan).  See JACKSON, supra note 151. 
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consistently been the second trading partner of the United States in the 
region after—and gradually losing ground to—China.  It is therefore logical 
that Japanese and U.S. parties conclude many international business 
transactions each year and that Japan is the most represented nationality in 
ICDR arbitration.  In turn, it is only logical that the high number of 
commercial transactions between the two countries led many U.S. lawyers to 
focus on Japan and some of them to move there.  Yet, this does not change 
the fact that there are many more U.S. lawyers in Japan than in any other 
Asian country and that this might be an essential reason why U.S. laws are 
chosen as the law governing so many contracts concluded between Japanese 
and U.S. parties.  After all, if the presence of U.S. lawyers had been as low 
in Japan as it is elsewhere in Asia, it is likely that local parties would have 
hired English lawyers, as they do in the rest of Asia, and that these lawyers 
would have advised to provide for the application of English law and for 
ICC, SIAC, or HKIAC arbitration.  Whichever part of the legal business 
requiring local presence would have been lost.  Again, it is unclear how 
much of the business requires a local presence.  For instance, U.S. lawyers 
would probably have been hired anyway by Japanese companies willing to 
invest in the U.S.  But, as previously argued, there is no doubt that a part of 
the business does require local presence and that U.S. lawyers were able to 
capture this business because they were present. 
D. Fear of the American Way of Law  
American lawyers and scholars correctly underscore American 
exceptionalism.  The American way of law is unique.155  As a result, a 
number of rules of U.S. law are not found in any other jurisdiction and are 
looked at with amazement by the rest of the world.  And for that purpose, 
there is no need to be a graduate student in a U.S. law school.  The 
continuous flow of American movies and series featuring the American legal 
and judicial system will have exposed the vast majority of educated people 
throughout the world to its most striking particularities. 
Those particularities do not make the American legal system better or 
worse.  But there is no doubt that they generate incomprehension and 
wonder in the rest of the world, and that incomprehension stirs up suspicion 
and fear.  In this respect, stories of old ladies obtaining millions in damages 
                                                   
155 See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM—THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001). 
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for being served a hot coffee in a fast food restaurant are extremely 
damaging. 156   
In 2011, a Task Force of the New York State Bar Association 
circulated a questionnaire among New York legal professionals asking what 
factors make New York law less desirable as governing law for cross-border 
commercial transactions.  One of the two published responses stated:  “U.S. 
litigation time, cost and anomalous aspects such as punitive damages; 
submission to U.S. jurisdiction for foreign entities and U.S. style 
discovery.”157  The same questionnaire also asked about factors that make 
New York courts less desirable as fora for resolution of international legal 
disputes.  One of the published responses stated:  “Generally, three things 
put off foreign contracting parties:  punitive damages, jury trials and absence 
of loser pays.”158
Many of the peculiarities of U.S. law are procedural in character:  jury 
trials, discovery, class actions and the like.  Thus, they would only be 
relevant to cases litigated in the United States.  By contrast, these three 
peculiarities and the threat of punitive damages would be plainly irrelevant 
in the context of arbitration in Singapore or Hong Kong.159  Parties to Asian 
business transactions could thus choose New York or California state law as 
the law governing the substance of their transaction with a clause providing 
for arbitration in Asia without fear of these peculiarities coming into play.  
But the distinction between venue and substantive law is a delicate one for 
non-lawyers and possibly even for some lawyers.160  Indeed, parties often 
link both when drafting their contract, as is demonstrated by the success of 
Singapore law in cases going to SIAC and the success of Swiss law in cases 
going to arbitration in Switzerland. 161  For many commercial parties, it may 
appear safer to simply avoid any reference whatsoever to the American 
system, venue or applicable law because the distinction is simply too 
                                                   
156 Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. 1994) (the award was 
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157 FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON NEW YORK 
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159 Punitive damages are typically excluded in international commercial arbitration, except in the 
United States.  See, e.g., Flintlock Const. Services, LLC v. Weiss, No. 156278/12, 2012 WL 5305213 (N.Y. 
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160 See NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE, supra note 157 and accompanying text (the 
response to the first question of the questionnaire of the task force reported). 
161 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
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sophisticated.  The data of SIAC and HKIAC, which show that U.S. laws are 
rarely chosen in arbitration under the aegis of these institutions, confirm this 
intuition.  
VI. CONCLUSION
My analysis identifies four factors that likely contribute to the 
remarkable success of English law in Asia.  While it is not possible to 
determine the relative importance of each of these factors, it seems that the 
presence of British common law-educated lawyers in Asia and the fear that 
the U.S. legal system generates are the most important.  If this is correct, it 
means that English law may owe its success to factors unrelated to the 
intrinsic quality of English contract law.  This conclusion would confirm the 
finding that parties to international business transactions are not necessarily 
sophisticated from a legal point of view or can suffer from cognitive 
limitations.162
This article’s primary purpose was to inquire as to whether there are 
regional variations in party preferences with respect to the law applicable to 
their business transactions.  The data studied in this article compared to that 
of the ICC clearly show that such regional differences exist, at least between 
Asia and Europe.  Received wisdom is that parties’ preferences in South 
America are also different.163  It would indeed be interesting to conduct 
similar studies in both North and South America, if comparable data can be 
found.164
                                                   
162 Cuniberti, supra note 7, at 508. 
163 See generally THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1. 
164 The author is presently conducting such research on Latin America. 
